60 Years, 6 Dams: How Salini Built Ethiopia’s Hydro Legacy













Salini’s Enduring Legacy: Six Dams That Reshaped Ethiopia’s Water and Power Landscape

Introduction: An Ethio-Italian Saga Forged in Concrete and Water

For more than sixty years, one Italian company has stood at the heart of Ethiopia’s transformation into the “Water Tower of Africa.” Salini Costruttori—today Webuild—is not merely a foreign contractor. Across four political regimes, from Emperor Haile Selassie’s monarchy to the present federal republic, the company embedded itself as Ethiopia’s indispensable engineering arm.

From Legadadi, which secured Addis Ababa’s water supply, to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydropower plant, Salini/Webuild’s concrete colossi have shaped Ethiopia’s economic aspirations, regional diplomacy, and domestic controversies. These dams are monuments to a national vision of progress, yet their legacy is also contested: displacing communities, altering ecosystems, and redrawing the geopolitics of the Nile Basin.

Salini/Webuild’s Major Dams in Ethiopia

Legadadi (1967–1971) — Securing Addis Ababa’s Water

River system: Legadadi/Sendafà

Purpose: Urban water supply (up to ~70% of Addis Ababa at inauguration)

Design highlights: Hollow gravity concrete main dam (44 m) plus rockfill saddle dam; treatment plant; ~24–30 km steel aqueducts

Long-run issue: Catchment agriculture drove sedimentation and nutrient loading; cyanobacteria blooms and degraded water quality—an early lesson in whole-catchment management

Gilgel Gibe I (1988–2004) — The Reservoir That Enabled a Cascade

River system: Gilgel Gibe / Omo

Purpose: Hydropower and regulation for downstream cascade

Installed capacity: 184 MW

Design highlights: ~40 m rock-fill embankment with bituminous face; ~917 Mm³ reservoir

Strategic role: Created a stable headwater source to feed Gilgel Gibe II

Gilgel Gibe II (2003–2010) — Tunnel Power, Not a Big Dam

River system: Gilgel Gibe / Omo

Purpose: High-head diversion to maximize energy without another vast reservoir

Installed capacity: 420 MW (four Pelton units)

Design highlights: ~49 m diversion structure and a ~26 km tunnel through the Fofa mountains; ~505 m gross head

Impact: On commissioning, lifted national generation by ~80%—a showcase of system-level planning

Gilgel Gibe III (2006–2016) — Colossus and Controversy on the Omo

River system: Omo

Purpose: Hydropower and flow regulation for irrigation schemes

Installed capacity: 1,870 MW

Design highlights: ~250 m roller-compacted concrete (RCC) gravity dam (once the world’s tallest RCC)

Controversies:



No-bid award near US$2bn; ESIA published after construction began







Elimination of the Omo’s natural annual flood undermined flood-recession farming and grazing, affecting ~200,000 indigenous people







Forced resettlement linked to state sugar estates; rights abuses documented







Downstream risk to Lake Turkana’s ecology, escalating cross-border concern

No-bid award near US$2bn; ESIA published after construction began

Elimination of the Omo’s natural annual flood undermined flood-recession farming and grazing, affecting ~200,000 indigenous people

Forced resettlement linked to state sugar estates; rights abuses documented

Downstream risk to Lake Turkana’s ecology, escalating cross-border concern

Koysha (2016–present) — Ambition Meets Fiscal Gravity

River system: Omo (fourth in the cascade)

Purpose: Hydropower

Planned capacity: 2,160 MW (eight Francis units)

Design highlights: ~180 m RCC gravity dam

Status & strain: ~60–65% complete; severe cost overrun (~151%) and FX constraints pushed Ethiopia toward exceptional commercial borrowing—stress-testing the debt-fueled model

GERD (2011–present) — Africa’s Largest Hydropower Project

River system: Blue Nile (Abay)

Purpose: Hydropower, national grid stabilization, potential regional exports

Installed capacity (design): 5,150 MW from 13 turbines

Design highlights: ~170 m RCC main dam (≈1.8 km long) plus long rockfill saddle dam; ~74 bcm reservoir

Financing identity: Largely domestically financed—bonds, diaspora contributions, salary deductions; Commercial Bank of Ethiopia shouldered the bulk—cementing its status as a sovereignty project

The GERD’s Political Economy and Execution

Sovereignty by Design

Launched in April 2011 during Egypt’s political upheaval, GERD publicly rejected the logic of colonial-era Nile treaties. Refusal by multilateral lenders catalyzed a domestic financing drive that transformed GERD into a mass-mobilization project—part infrastructure, part nation-building.

Civil Works vs. Electromechanical Reality

Salini/Webuild led the civil works; Ethiopia’s state-owned METEC handled turbines and steelworks. Chronic delays, quality issues, and alleged graft led to METEC’s termination in 2018 and high-profile arrests—illustrating how governance failures can bog down even well-executed civil engineering.

Economic Payoffs and Practical Bottlenecks

The Energy Engine Ethiopia Wants

Hydropower is the backbone of Ethiopia’s industrial strategy: lower-cost, renewable electricity to power manufacturing, expand access for 120+ million people, and export to neighbors through high-voltage interconnectors.

The Frictions Holding It Back

Transmission constraints: Grid upgrades and cross-border interconnectors lag megaproject timelines, slowing export revenues.

Debt pressure: Cost overruns (notably Koysha) and foreign exchange scarcity complicate project completion and operations.

Operational risks: Sedimentation from highland erosion threatens reservoir lifespans; climate variability may alter inflows and generation profiles.

Human and Environmental Costs

Omo Basin: Development Without the Flood

Gibe III ended the Omo’s natural flood pulse. The result: collapse of flood-retreat agriculture and pasture cycles; food insecurity and displacement among indigenous communities; heightened conflict over shrinking resources; and transboundary ecological risk focused on Lake Turkana.

GERD: Fewer Local Displacements, Bigger Geopolitics

While GERD avoided the Lower Omo’s displacement patterns, it ignited a decade of geopolitical friction with Egypt and Sudan, transforming a civil engineering project into Africa’s most consequential water-security dispute.

The GERD Negotiations—Milestones Without a Binding Deal

2011 — Announcement and Ground-Breaking

Ethiopia begins construction without prior basin-wide agreement, reframing the Nile status quo.

2012 — Tripartite International Panel of Experts

Technical reviews establish a basis for dialogue but not a roadmap for operations.

2015 — Declaration of Principles (Khartoum)

Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan endorse cooperation, equitable use, and no significant harm—but leave rules for drought and long-term operations unresolved.

2019–Feb 2020 — U.S./World Bank Observers

Talks intensify; Ethiopia exits final meetings, citing sovereignty and bias concerns.

July 2020 — First Filling

Ethiopia commences filling unilaterally; the dispute reaches the UN Security Council before returning to African Union mediation.

2020–2025 — AU Rounds and Repeated Deadlocks

Multiple AU-facilitated efforts fail to yield a binding filling/operation agreement; de facto realities on the ground outpace diplomacy.

What Endures: Webuild’s Dual Legacy in Ethiopia

Monumental Achievements

A six-project arc culminating in Africa’s largest hydropower plant

System-level design (Gibe I + II) that squeezed megawatts from topography rather than more concrete

A durable construction partnership across wildly different Ethiopian governments

Inescapable Costs

Omo basin dispossession and ecological disruption

Debt and FX vulnerabilities, with Koysha emblematic of the financing squeeze

Geopolitics of the Nile, still unresolved and highly consequential

The Road Ahead

Sustaining this legacy demands:

Catchment rehabilitation to slow sedimentation (reforestation, terracing, watershed governance)

Grid and interconnector investment to monetize surplus power and stabilize the system

Climate-smart operations (adaptive rule curves, regional coordination)

Credible, inclusive diplomacy to turn GERD from flashpoint into anchor of basin cooperation

Conclusion: Concrete That Still Moves

Salini/Webuild helped engineer a new Ethiopian reality. Its dams are not static monuments; they are active forces—spinning turbines, redirecting rivers, shifting livelihoods, and recalibrating regional power. The legacy is both nation-building and nation-testing. Whether it ultimately reads as triumph or cautionary tale will depend less on concrete already poured than on governance, diplomacy, ecology, and finance in the years ahead.