President Taye Atsek Selassie Appoints New Military Leadership

President Taye Atsek Selassie Appoints New Military Leadership Addis Ababa, September 10, 2018 (FMC) — Ethiopia’s military command structure witnessed a major reshuffle on Monday after President Taye Atsek Selassie, acting on the recommendation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD), approved the promotion and appointment of dozens of high-ranking officers across the armed forces. The appointments, which span the ranks of General, Lieutenant General, Major General, and Brigadier General, mark one of the most significant leadership updates in recent years and are seen as part of the government’s ongoing efforts to professionalize the defense establishment and consolidate institutional loyalty during a period of political transition. Four Officers Promoted to Full General The highest promotions went to four senior officers elevated to the rank of General: Lt. Gen. Alemshet Degfe Lt. Gen. Desta Abche Lt. Gen. Yimer Mekonnen Lt. Gen. Driba Mekonnen These officers are expected to take on enhanced strategic responsibilities, overseeing critical defense operations and contributing to Ethiopia’s security policymaking. New Lieutenant Generals Two Major Generals were advanced to the rank of Lieutenant General: Maj. Gen. Fefyalew Amde Tessema Maj. Gen. Kindu Gezu Tegen Their promotions reflect both battlefield experience and long-standing service within Ethiopia’s military institutions. Expanding the Ranks of Major Generals A total of 17 Brigadier Generals received appointments as Major Generals, a move that broadens the leadership cadre available to the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Among them are: Brig. Gen. Tadesse Amelo Siasa Brig. Gen. Bulti Tadesse Kitila Brig. Gen. Hailu Endeshawu Atomsa Brig. Gen. Wapnew Aleme Ayalew Brig. Gen. Negera Lelisa Muleta Brig. Gen. Tesfaye Regasa Amente Brig. Gen. Dereje Megersa Eseta Brig. Gen. Berhe Gebermedhin Sada Brig. Gen. Yassin Mohamed Sisay Brig. Gen. Zewudu Wittarge Demeke Brig. Gen. Milkesa Regasa Itefa Brig. Gen. Meles Mengistu Nrey Brig. Gen. Teshome Anagaw Ayele Brig. Gen. Amare Bahta Berhe Brig. Gen. Abebaw Said Yimer Brig. Gen. Desta Temesgen Aragaw Brig. Gen. Kemal Ebiso Forty-Three Colonels Elevated to Brigadier General The reshuffle also saw an unprecedented 43 Colonels promoted to Brigadier General, reflecting the government’s bid to inject fresh leadership into the upper ranks. The list includes seasoned officers such as Col. Girma Feye Kebede, Col. Demeke Mengistu Tsedu, Col. Temesgen Asmamau Asnake, Col. Getnet Adane Kassa, Col. Yohannes Mekonnen Ejeta, and Col. Ababoo Sheme Legese, among many others. This large intake into the Brigadier General rank will play a critical role in operational commands, logistical management, and regional deployments. Significance of the Appointments The sweeping nature of these promotions underscores Ethiopia’s ongoing military restructuring. Analysts suggest that the appointments are intended to strengthen the government’s hold over the defense apparatus at a time of political reform and shifting security dynamics in the Horn of Africa. By promoting a mix of experienced generals and rising officers, the administration appears to be balancing continuity with renewal, while also ensuring that trusted commanders occupy key positions in the ENDF. The Ethiopian government has emphasized that these promotions are not only a recognition of past service but also a strategic investment in the future stability of the nation. With regional security challenges and internal political reforms underway, the new leadership team will be closely watched for how effectively it manages Ethiopia’s defense priorities.

Ethiopian MP Christian Tadele Critically Ill in Detention, Family and Lawyer Warn

Ethiopian MP Christian Tadele Critically Ill in Detention, Family and Lawyer Warn Addis Ababa – September 17, 2025 — The family and lawyer of detained Ethiopian parliamentarian Ato Christian Tadele say the opposition figure’s health has deteriorated sharply while he remains in custody at Kilinto prison, sparking fresh calls for urgent medical intervention and independent monitoring. Christian Tadele, a prominent member of the House of People’s Representatives elected under the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) banner, was arrested on 4 August 2023 after the federal government declared a state of emergency in the conflict-torn Amhara region. His parliamentary immunity was formally lifted on 14 March 2024, clearing the way for prosecutors to pursue charges under Ethiopia’s Criminal Code, including alleged violations of the anti-terrorism and weapons control proclamations. Health Crisis After Surgery According to his lawyer, Solomon Gezahegne, and a close family member who spoke to the BBC on condition of anonymity, Tadele underwent surgery at Kerderez Hospital several months ago but was returned to Kilinto prison without adequate medical supervision. Both say his condition has worsened dramatically since. “When I heard that he was unwell, I went to see him,” Solomon told the BBC. “He looked very sick and tired.” He said limited access to proper monitoring, appropriate food and basic necessities such as blankets has compounded the problem. Family members echoed the concern, adding that prison authorities have repeatedly blocked their attempts to bring in court-approved items and food tailored to his recovery. The relative described Tadele as “very sick; he does not even stand up and talk to us,” and said visits are marred by harassment and intimidation from prison staff. Legal and Political Backdrop Tadele, who once chaired the parliament’s standing committee on government expenditure and oversight, faces charges for alleged offences under Ethiopia’s Criminal Code, the Prevention of Terrorism Proclamation and the Weapons Management and Control Proclamation. Prosecutors began presenting witnesses in March 2024, and the case remains before the courts. His arrest came amid a federal crackdown on opposition voices and armed groups in Amhara. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, have criticised the government’s broad use of state-of-emergency powers, warning they enable arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention without adequate safeguards. Calls for International Scrutiny Tadele’s family is urging Ethiopian authorities and international human rights organisations to intervene, demanding that he be granted immediate, independent medical care. “We ask human rights organizations to visit prisoners whose rights are being violated so that he can receive the treatment he needs,” the relative said. As of mid-September 2025, no government statement has addressed the specific allegations of medical neglect. Rights groups continue to call for transparency and due process in the treatment of political detainees held under the emergency decree. Christian Tadele’s case has become emblematic of the tension between Ethiopia’s security crackdowns and the protection of basic rights — a tension now sharpened by the urgent question of whether the detained MP will receive life-saving medical attention before it is too late.

What Congo Can Learn from Ethiopia’s GERD: A Blueprint for Harnessing the Congo River’s Power

What Congo Can Learn from Ethiopia’s GERD: A Blueprint for Harnessing the Congo River’s Power Lessons from the Nile: A Strategic Blueprint for Harnessing the Congo River’s Potential Executive Summary: A Tale of Two Rivers The divergent destinies of Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) Inga dam projects illustrate two contrasting pathways in African mega-infrastructure. Ethiopia’s GERD emerged as a symbol of sovereign ambition and collective action, financed almost entirely from within and completed despite geopolitical headwinds. The DRC’s Inga complex, by contrast, remains a half-realized dream: vast in potential yet paralyzed by decades of political volatility, corruption and over-dependence on foreign capital. Ethiopia shows that a domestically anchored, nationally owned approach can overcome external resistance and create transformative energy access. For the DRC, where barely 20 % of the population has electricity despite the Congo River’s unmatched hydropower capacity, the GERD story offers a practical roadmap: finance from within, build transparent governance insulated from political interference, and ensure that the first beneficiaries are Congolese citizens, not distant mines or foreign grids. Introduction: Ethiopia’s Renaissance vs. Congo’s Paradox The Congo River is the world’s second-largest by flow, and the Inga site alone could generate up to 70 GW—enough to power half of the United States. Yet fewer than one in five Congolese have access to electricity; in rural areas the figure falls below 5 %. This striking energy poverty stands beside almost limitless potential. Ethiopia faced a similar dilemma two decades ago. Landlocked and energy-starved, it nonetheless built the 5,150 MW GERD on the Blue Nile—Africa’s largest hydroelectric plant—despite fierce opposition from downstream Egypt and limited access to foreign finance. The GERD is now a pillar of Ethiopia’s industrialization strategy and a case study in how political resolve and domestic ownership can convert natural endowment into development. The Ethiopian Model: A National Project for a Nation’s Future From Dormant Idea to National Mission First conceived in the 1950s, GERD lay dormant until 2011, when Prime Minister Meles Zenawi framed it as an act of national self-determination: “No matter how poor we are, we will pay any sacrifice.” The dam became not just an engineering project but a unifying national mission to electrify a country where most people literally lived in darkness. Financing from Within When international lenders, under Egyptian lobbying, balked, Ethiopia turned inward. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia provided roughly 91 % of the funds, complemented by domestic bond sales and small citizen donations—including schoolchildren’s lunch money. This “crowdfunded sovereignty” transformed Ethiopians into stakeholders and neutralized external leverage. It also gave the project political irreversibility: a national investment no government could abandon. Managing Geopolitical Headwinds Egypt invoked colonial-era treaties and mobilized allies to block financing. Ethiopia countered with a consistent message: GERD is a non-consumptive hydropower project that will not deprive downstream nations of water. By self-financing and proceeding steadily—including reservoir filling—Ethiopia converted diplomatic disputes into faits accomplis. The absence of downstream water shortages during initial operations effectively disarmed the strongest objections. The Grand Inga Conundrum: The Stalled Giant A Titan in Waiting The Congo River’s total hydro potential exceeds 100 GW. Grand Inga alone could double the capacity of China’s Three Gorges Dam. Its steep 96-meter drop makes it ideal for “run-of-river” generation requiring only modest reservoirs. White Elephants and Maintenance Failures Inga I and II, built in the 1970s–80s under Mobutu Sese Seko, were intended to feed copper mines hundreds of kilometers away. Of their 1,775 MW capacity, less than half operates today; half the turbines are idle for want of maintenance. Local communities displaced during construction remain uncompensated, breeding decades of mistrust. Grand Inga’s Endless False Starts Since Belgian colonial planners first proposed it in 1959, Grand Inga has lurched from memorandum to memorandum—China Three Gorges one year, Spanish consortia the next—without breaking ground. Price tags of US$80–100 billion and persistent political instability deter serious investors. The World Bank’s Revolving Door The World Bank repeatedly engaged then withdrew, most notably cancelling a US$73 million technical-assistance grant in 2016 after Kinshasa placed the project agency under direct presidential control. Though the Bank re-entered in 2025 with a US$1 billion commitment, Congolese civil society warns that the underlying governance deficits remain unresolved. Foreign Markets First, Citizens Last Historically the Inga vision has prioritized exports—to South African utilities, Angolan grids, even mooted links to Europe—while Congolese households remain largely unserved. Critics fear a classic resource-curse dynamic: vast natural wealth exploited for external benefit while domestic poverty persists. Lessons for the DRC: A Strategic Roadmap Four core lessons emerge: Domestic Ownership of Finance GERD proves that a mega-dam can be built without dependence on foreign lenders. The DRC should create a hybrid model anchored in domestic funding—bonds for the Congolese diaspora, contributions from state-owned utility SNEL, even salary-linked bond programs—to reduce vulnerability to external politics. Governance and Institutional Insulation Ethiopia maintained a clear, state-led project authority insulated from day-to-day politics. DRC must establish an autonomous, transparently governed Inga Authority with published procurement rules and independent oversight. Sovereignty in Project Design Instead of exporting most output, the DRC must prioritize national electrification. Power Purchase Agreements should first guarantee supply to Congolese households and industries; only surplus power should be sold abroad. People as Primary Beneficiaries Community engagement and fair compensation are prerequisites. Pairing large hydropower with decentralized renewables—solar mini-grids, micro-hydro—can extend access to remote rural populations and reduce pressure on forests. Recommendations and Forward Look Three-Phase Action Plan Phase I – Governance & Planning Create a new, independent Inga Authority. Publish all past feasibility and environmental studies. Conduct free, prior and informed consultations with affected communities. Phase II – Financing & Partnerships Launch a domestic fundraising campaign to build national ownership. Structure foreign participation as minority stakes under a transparent Public-Private Partnership with political-risk insurance. Phase III – Implementation Rehabilitate Inga I and II immediately to show tangible domestic benefits. Develop Grand Inga in modular phases to lower upfront cost and generate early revenues. Sign PPAs that put Congolese consumers first. A Broader Vision for the Congo Basin The Congo River is more than a hydro resource; it anchors the world’s second-largest rainforest and a vital global carbon sink. A re-imagined Grand Inga can become the spearhead of an integrated energy strategy—large dams complemented by decentralized renewables—while safeguarding biodiversity and local livelihoods. Conclusion Ethiopia’s GERD demonstrates that political will, domestic finance and a people-centered narrative can turn hydropower potential into national transformation. For the DRC, the lesson is not to replicate GERD’s engineering but its governance DNA: sovereignty, transparency and citizen benefit. Only then can the Congo River’s power flow not just across borders but into Congolese homes and industries—transforming the Inga site from a symbol of lost opportunity into the engine of a sustainable national renaissance.

Ethiopia Abstains on UN Vote for Landmark Palestine Two-State Resolution

Ethiopia Abstains on UN Vote for Landmark Palestine Two-State Resolution Ethiopia’s Latest Move: Abstention on the New York Accord At the United Nations General Assembly this week, Ethiopia joined a small group of countries that abstained from voting on the resolution endorsing the New York Accord, a France–Saudi Arabia initiative to push forward a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The resolution passed overwhelmingly—142 in favor, 10 against, 12 abstentions—despite sharp objections from Israel and the United States. Washington’s UN ambassador Morgan Ortagus warned it “undermines genuine diplomatic efforts” and “emboldens Hamas,” while Israel’s envoy Danny Danon called it evidence of “a lack of commitment to peace.” By withholding its vote, Ethiopia signaled neither endorsement nor opposition. Diplomats in Addis Ababa framed the abstention as an effort to balance historic solidarity with the Palestinian cause and the country’s growing strategic ties with Israel and the United States, both key partners in security and technology. The move underscores Ethiopia’s careful diplomacy at a time when it seeks foreign investment and Western backing amid its own internal political challenges. Ethiopia’s Voting Pattern on Palestine in Recent Years Ethiopia’s abstention is not an isolated event. Over the past several years, its voting record on Palestine-related resolutions shows a deliberate middle path: December 2022 – UNGA Resolution on Palestinian self-determination: Ethiopia voted in favor, aligning with the African Union consensus supporting Palestinian statehood. December 2022 – Resolution requesting an International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation: Ethiopia abstained, reflecting caution over a measure strongly opposed by Israel and the U.S. May 2021 – Emergency UNGA session on Gaza hostilities: Ethiopia abstained, calling for de-escalation and negotiations without assigning blame. December 2017 – Resolution rejecting the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital: Ethiopia voted in favor, joining the overwhelming majority that reaffirmed the international consensus on Jerusalem’s status. This pattern illustrates a dual-track strategy: support for the principle of Palestinian statehood and international law, but reluctance to back measures that could strain strategic relations with Israel and key Western partners. Strategic Calculations Ethiopia’s foreign policy is shaped by a blend of factors: Security cooperation with Israel, particularly in intelligence and technology, which Addis Ababa values amid its own regional security concerns. Dependence on Western aid and investment, making it sensitive to U.S. positions. African Union tradition of backing Palestinian statehood, which Ethiopia, as host of the AU headquarters, cannot ignore. By abstaining on the New York Accord, Ethiopia maintains diplomatic flexibility—keeping doors open to all sides while signaling that it remains committed to dialogue rather than unilateral declarations. Ethiopia’s Abstention on the “New York Accord” and its Record on Palestine Votes Ethiopia’s Latest Move: Abstention on the New York Accord At the United Nations General Assembly this week, Ethiopia joined a small group of countries that abstained from voting on the resolution endorsing the New York Accord, a France–Saudi Arabia initiative to push forward a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The resolution passed overwhelmingly—142 in favor, 10 against, 12 abstentions—despite sharp objections from Israel and the United States. Washington’s UN ambassador Morgan Ortagus warned it “undermines genuine diplomatic efforts” and “emboldens Hamas,” while Israel’s envoy Danny Danon called it evidence of “a lack of commitment to peace.” By withholding its vote, Ethiopia signaled neither endorsement nor opposition. Diplomats in Addis Ababa framed the abstention as an effort to balance historic solidarity with the Palestinian cause and the country’s growing strategic ties with Israel and the United States, both key partners in security and technology. The move underscores Ethiopia’s careful diplomacy at a time when it seeks foreign investment and Western backing amid its own internal political challenges. Ethiopia’s Voting Pattern on Palestine in Recent Years Ethiopia’s abstention is not an isolated event. Over the past several years, its voting record on Palestine-related resolutions shows a deliberate middle path: December 2022 – UNGA Resolution on Palestinian self-determination: Ethiopia voted in favor, aligning with the African Union consensus supporting Palestinian statehood. December 2022 – Resolution requesting an International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation: Ethiopia abstained, reflecting caution over a measure strongly opposed by Israel and the U.S. May 2021 – Emergency UNGA session on Gaza hostilities: Ethiopia abstained, calling for de-escalation and negotiations without assigning blame. December 2017 – Resolution rejecting the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital: Ethiopia voted in favor, joining the overwhelming majority that reaffirmed the international consensus on Jerusalem’s status. This pattern illustrates a dual-track strategy: support for the principle of Palestinian statehood and international law, but reluctance to back measures that could strain strategic relations with Israel and key Western partners. Strategic Calculations Ethiopia’s foreign policy is shaped by a blend of factors: Security cooperation with Israel, particularly in intelligence and technology, which Addis Ababa values amid its own regional security concerns. Dependence on Western aid and investment, making it sensitive to U.S. positions. African Union tradition of backing Palestinian statehood, which Ethiopia, as host of the AU headquarters, cannot ignore. By abstaining on the New York Accord, Ethiopia maintains diplomatic flexibility—keeping doors open to all sides while signaling that it remains committed to dialogue rather than unilateral declarations. Ethiopia’s careful balancing act underscores the complex diplomacy of a country seeking to reconcile historic solidarity with Palestinians and evolving strategic partnerships, a stance that has become a defining feature of its votes on the world stage.

Trump Administration Renews Ethiopia-Related National Emergency

Trump Administration Renews Ethiopia-Related National Emergency Trump Administration Renews Ethiopia-Related National Emergency, Citing Ongoing Horn of Africa Instability The White House has decided to keep in place a key foreign-policy tool first deployed under President Joe Biden, extending for another year the U.S. national emergency that targets Ethiopia’s still-fragile peace. The move underscores Washington’s enduring concern that the conflict and political turbulence in the Horn of Africa remain a direct threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. In a formal notice issued Wednesday, President Donald Trump confirmed that the emergency—initially proclaimed on 17 September 2021 under Executive Order 14046—will remain in effect beyond 17 September 2025. The order was originally crafted at the height of Ethiopia’s civil war, when fighting in the Tigray, Amhara and Afar regions spiraled into one of Africa’s most brutal conflicts in decades. “The situation in and in relation to northern Ethiopia, which has been marked by activities that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Ethiopia and the greater Horn of Africa region, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,” the White House notice stated. Origins Under Biden Biden’s 2021 executive order invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, declaring that the violence—characterized by atrocities, ethnic-based attacks, sexual violence and obstruction of humanitarian aid—constituted “an unusual and extraordinary threat.” The order allowed the U.S. Treasury and State Departments to impose sanctions on individuals and entities accused of fueling the conflict or hindering humanitarian operations. Two years later, in September 2023, Biden broadened the measure, adding new sanctions authority against those seen as obstructing peace and humanitarian relief even as Ethiopia and Tigrayan forces moved toward a negotiated ceasefire. A Persistent Flashpoint Although the 2022 Pretoria Agreement between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front eased large-scale fighting, the Horn of Africa remains volatile. Tensions between regional militias and the federal government continue to spark sporadic clashes, and humanitarian agencies warn that millions remain vulnerable to famine and displacement. Neighboring countries—including Sudan and Eritrea—have their own political upheavals that can spill across borders. For Washington, those conditions still amount to a strategic risk. The Horn sits astride key maritime routes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, where global trade lanes converge and where U.S. naval operations help protect shipping from piracy and regional conflict. Legal Mechanics and Next Steps Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, a national emergency automatically expires after one year unless the president renews it. Trump’s renewal ensures that Executive Order 14046 remains active, keeping intact the U.S. government’s ability to freeze assets, restrict travel and impose targeted sanctions. The White House said the notice will be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to Congress. The decision signals continuity across administrations on U.S. policy toward Ethiopia—despite the change in the Oval Office—highlighting bipartisan consensus that the region’s instability still poses a “continuing and unusual threat.”

Abiy Ahmed Declares: Ethiopia’s Red Sea ‘Mistake’ Will Be Corrected

Abiy Ahmed Declares: Ethiopia’s Red Sea ‘Mistake’ Will Be Corrected Addis Ababa – Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has once again placed Ethiopia’s long-standing quest for direct access to the Red Sea at the center of national debate, declaring in a televised interview that “the mistake made 30 years ago will be corrected tomorrow.” Speaking alongside his Social Affairs Advisor during a discussion on the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Abiy drew a parallel between Ethiopia’s centuries-old struggle over the Nile and its current status as a landlocked country. “The Red Sea was in our hands 30 years ago. That history was yesterday’s mistake. Tomorrow it will be corrected. It is not too difficult,” he said. A Landlocked Nation’s Existential Dilemma Ethiopia became the largest landlocked country in Africa when Eritrea gained independence in 1993. The separation severed Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea, including the once-strategic port of Assab, forcing the country to rely heavily on Djibouti for nearly all of its import and export trade. Prime Minister Abiy argued that Ethiopia’s growing population and economic ambitions make the issue urgent. “We have been silent for decades, but remaining a prisoner of the land is no longer sustainable. This is not a matter of pride—it has become an existential issue,” he said, underscoring that access to a seaport is now a matter of national survival. Rising Tensions with Eritrea The Prime Minister’s comments have not sat well with Asmara. Eritrean officials view Addis Ababa’s insistence on “correcting” the Red Sea issue as a veiled challenge to their sovereignty. Relations between the two neighbors—already strained after Ethiopia’s peace deal with Eritrea faltered—have deteriorated further amid Eritrea’s growing cooperation with Egypt, a rival of Ethiopia in the GERD dispute. Earlier this year, Abiy told Ethiopia’s parliament that securing seaport access would be pursued “on the basis of mutual benefit, common use, and market principles,” insisting there was “no need for a fight.” Eritrea, however, has accused Ethiopia of belligerence, with President Isaias Afwerki warning that outside geopolitical forces may be influencing Addis Ababa’s stance. Military and Legal Arguments Major General Teshome Gemechu, Director of Foreign Relations and Military Cooperation at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Defense, echoed Abiy’s framing. In an interview with Prime Media, he laid out four main reasons behind Ethiopia’s push for a sea outlet: Historical Ties – The general emphasized that the Red Sea, particularly Assab, historically belonged to Ethiopia. “When we say we have a historical relationship, this sea was with us. Assab was autonomous,” he said. International Law – Ethiopia’s geographic proximity to the Red Sea, he argued, gives it legal standing. “Distance from the Red Sea is evidence under international law that supports Ethiopia’s claim.” National Security – Teshome warned that without a sea outlet, Ethiopia remains vulnerable to threats launched from maritime domains. “We need a sea gate to defend our cities and even our capital from water-based threats,” he noted. Existential Imperative – Finally, he described seaport access as vital to Ethiopia’s very survival. “This is not about prestige. Existence is a national interest that requires paying any price,” he concluded, stressing that Ethiopia prefers diplomacy but will not ignore security concerns. The Assab Controversy The general also questioned the legitimacy of Eritrea’s ownership of Assab, claiming that Ethiopia’s transitional government of the early 1990s lacked the authority to relinquish it. “A transitional government that was not elected by the people had no mandate to hand over a sea gate,” he said. This position has added fuel to speculation about whether Ethiopia may eventually test Eritrea’s resolve over the port through diplomatic or even military means. Diplomatic Path or Collision Course? Despite the heated rhetoric, Prime Minister Abiy has repeatedly said that Ethiopia “has no interest in fighting Eritrea over the Red Sea.” He insists discussions will be guided by mutual benefit, but his framing of seaport access as a “life-and-death matter” has unsettled Eritrea and raised regional concerns. For now, Ethiopia continues to depend on Djibouti, but Abiy’s latest remarks suggest the question of Red Sea access will remain a defining issue in Ethiopian politics. Whether it becomes a matter of negotiation, confrontation, or long-term strategic patience remains to be seen.

Ethiopia’s Parliament Repeals Controversial Immunity for Undercover Investigators Committing Crimes Except Murder

Ethiopia’s Parliament Repeals Controversial Immunity for Undercover Investigators Committing Crimes Except Murder Parliament has repealed a controversial legal provision that exempted undercover investigators from criminal liability for offenses committed in the line of duty—excluding murder. Critics argued the clause could be interpreted too broadly and undermine the rule of law. The provision was originally part of the Proclamation on the Prevention and Control of the Crime of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism, which amended a 12-year-old law and was approved by Parliament on June 10, 2017 E.C. Under the original text, “a person assigned to carry out undercover investigations or to perform arrests under cover shall not be subject to criminal prosecution for any criminal act committed while on duty, for reasons beyond his/her control and against his/her will, except for the crime of murder.” This clause faced strong criticism from opposition party members and human rights advocates, who warned it could enable abuses of power, weaken accountability, and lead to serious human rights violations. When it was introduced, the House of People’s Representatives’ Legal and Justice Affairs Committee defended the provision as necessary to make “special investigations more effective.” The Standing Committee justified it by arguing that officers using “special investigative methods” were acting in the public interest and needed legal protection to carry out their duties without fear of prosecution. However, concerns over the vague language and potential misuse of the exemption persisted. At a special session of the House of Representatives on Monday, June 30, the Standing Committee formally submitted a resolution to repeal the clause. Ato Isa Boru, deputy chairman of the committee, explained to Parliament that the provision risked being interpreted too broadly and could negatively impact the law’s enforcement. He emphasized that since the amended proclamation had not yet been officially published, the repeal was being submitted in time to remove the problematic clause before implementation. The repeal aims to ensure that the legal framework for combating money laundering and terrorism financing remains robust, transparent, and consistent with human rights standards, without offering blanket immunity to law enforcement officers engaged in covert operations.

Contesting the Politics of Statistics in Ethiopia

Contesting the Politics of Statistics in Ethiopia By Eyob Asfaw On July 3, 2025, PM Abiy addressed the House of Peoples’ Representatives, where he shared his quantitative figures quite liberally. The question of what these figures mean—and what they do not—captivated my mind, as I want to make sense of them as a student of Development. It is not uncommon to build a consensus that numbers and quantitative presentations represent objective reality. Although the figures and statistics went largely unnoticed in news headlines, PM Abiy’s address on numbers is no less contested than his positions on violence, inter-party, and regional politics. If someone were tasked with issuing a report card for PM Abiy, what passing mark would they give him, and how would they rate his performance in disclosing statistical data? This is a topic worth discussing. In this piece, I will highlight the contestability of government figures. Recently, I sought advice from a professional working in one of the government ministries about the quality of data from government sources. Positioned to collect and aggregate data from different sectors, he expressed reservations about administrative data. He openly asked, “How can a university supervisor easily accept data from administrative bodies when its trustworthiness is in question, given that sometimes the data is inflated?” In this context, the seminal work of the seasoned statistics professor Philip Hauser is instructive. He contended that, despite its potential to create pressure for policy and action, government-generated statistics often end up clouded by political smoke. One dominant narrative holds that the government is the chief supplier of state-based statistics and that this offsets the politics surrounding them. In the domestic context, my notes from PM Abiy’s speech include claims such as the export of 37 tons of gold; 13 million tourists visiting Unity Park; Ethiopian Airlines acquiring 13 aircraft; and earning 8.3 billion USD from the service sector out of a total of 32 billion USD in foreign exchange. Meanwhile, his administration is facing an outstanding 300 billion birr trade imbalance, and 46,000 taxpayers reported a zero balance for tax exemption. Nonetheless, these and other undisclosed figures are, debatably, enough to gauge his administration’s performance—and PM Abiy’s report card might even be promoted to distinction. As usual, PM Abiy offered a well-rehearsed response to criticism over the Ethiopian budget’s decline in USD terms. He provocatively said, “I commend you parliamentarians to measure growth neither in birr nor in forex, but in quintals of products.” This response makes some sense as a way to dilute the overemphasis on financial economics and the fixation on nominal macroeconomic indicators. From the vantage point of Economics 101, what matters most are aggregate outputs of land, resources, capital, labor, and entrepreneurship, rather than their nominal cash values. PM Abiy also addressed tax compliance. Beyond the 37 percent of loyal taxpayers, he advised the rest to cultivate the habit of paying taxes instead of disguising income through the informal economy, engaging in tax evasion, or reporting zero or negative balances. His approach here is softer rather than harsh toward the non-compliant business community. Given that wage-earning and public employees are generally loyal taxpayers, one might expect him to react more bitterly, instead of merely encouraging business owners to “love their country.” Stronger regulation seems more important to ensure compliance. On another point, he mentioned that 40 percent of tax is collected from public enterprises. What does that mean? Isn’t this growth counterproductive to the promise of the Homegrown Economic Reforms, which vow to make the private sector the frontline driver of economic growth? I think this requires further consideration by the top echelon of government to close the gap between economic policy and practice. Regarding job creation, PM Abiy defended his administration’s claim of creating 4.5 million jobs per year. But isn’t that figure inflated for a country with annual labor-force growth of 2.5–3%? From the demand and supply sides of the labor market, one might ask: Where do the extra 2 million jobs come from? Is the government truly outperforming, given that the Afrobarometer 2024 Survey reported that 74% of Ethiopians are dissatisfied with the government’s job-creation efforts? Setting aside my deeper analysis of the sectoral composition of employment for my dissertation, at this point I simply want to ask whether the Ministry of Labor and Skills misled him. I think these statistics deserve a second look by PM Abiy’s administration—or else, perhaps, double-counting of employment is on the rise. In reality, the unemployment rate can be considered normal if it stays around the global average of 5%. Scholars argue that unemployment can never be fully eliminated from an economy—just as inflation cannot. In sum, I am reminded of what one of my professors used to say: “Listen to all sides of any contestation, think critically, but always aim for balance.” It is difficult to either accept without question or completely dismiss what PM Abiy addressed before parliament. However, counterbalancing government-released figures will always be essential for sustaining and ensuring inclusive economic growth. Eyob Asfaw ([email protected]) is a staff member at Addis Ababa University and currently a PhD candidate in Sustainable Development at CSD, AAU. 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Beyond the Law: Ethiopia Approves Shocking Immunity for Investigators—Except for Murder

Beyond the Law: Ethiopia Approves Shocking Immunity for Investigators—Except for Murder Ethiopia’s House of People’s Representatives has approved a controversial amendment to the country’s longstanding anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism proclamation, sparking strong criticism from legal experts and parliamentarians who warn that the changes could enable serious human rights violations. The amendment, passed on Tuesday, modifies a key provision in the 58-article proclamation first enacted in 2005 to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The specific revision grants broad immunity to individuals conducting undercover investigations—shielding them from criminal prosecution for acts committed “beyond their capacity” or “without their authorization,” with the sole exception of murder. Broad Immunity for Undercover Agents According to the newly amended provision, an individual engaged in a special investigative procedure cannot be held criminally liable for any offense other than murder, even if their actions would otherwise constitute a serious crime, provided they acted beyond their capacity or without explicit consent. The explanatory note submitted to parliament rationalized this immunity by asserting that such investigators act “in the public interest,” and should be protected if they unintentionally commit crimes in the course of duty. The change has proven divisive among lawmakers. Critics argue that the vague language and absence of limits on the types of crimes covered under the immunity clause effectively grant investigators unchecked powers with minimal accountability. Legal Experts Sound the Alarm Speaking to the BBC, prominent human rights advocate Yared Hailemariam, Director General of the Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center, condemned the amendment. He warned that the provision could serve as a legal shield for grave abuses, including torture and inhumane treatment. “This clause opens the door to human rights abuses,” Yared stated. “By not explicitly prohibiting excessive use of force or torture, the law gives a green light to acts that could cause permanent physical or psychological harm.” He also criticized the ambiguous phrasing “except for murder,” questioning whether other serious crimes—such as torture during interrogation—could now be treated as legally permissible. “The failure to clearly state what is off-limits, such as torture, is deeply concerning. This omission provides legal cover for intentional or unintentional abuse by investigators,” Yared added. International criminal law expert Ato Kassahun Molla Yilma echoed these concerns. “The provision lacks a requirement for prior judicial or executive authorization, which is a basic safeguard in comparable legal systems,” he explained. “Other countries demand that potentially illegal investigative acts be approved by a court or senior authority. Without such mechanisms, there is no oversight.” Kassahun noted that international human rights treaties—many of which Ethiopia is a signatory to—explicitly prohibit torture, inhumane, and degrading treatment under any circumstances. “The absence of a clear list of non-derogable crimes undermines Ethiopia’s obligations under international law,” he said. He further criticized the subjective language of the amendment, particularly the phrase “beyond his or her capacity,” calling it legally vague. “This introduces dangerous gaps in interpretation. In other jurisdictions, legal standards like ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ guide such immunities. Ethiopia’s law, in contrast, leaves too much room for abuse,” Kassahun warned. Concerns from Parliament Members The amendment also drew skepticism from several members of the House during the parliamentary session. Dr. Alemu Gonfa, a representative from the ruling Prosperity Party in Oromia’s Dano constituency, questioned the logic of granting such sweeping immunity. “It doesn’t seem right to declare that someone should never be prosecuted for a crime,” Dr. Alemu said. “If we want to protect investigators, we must clearly define that only actions within their legal mandate are covered—not all criminal acts.” Dr. Desalegn Chane, a representative of the opposition Amhara National Movement, voiced similar worries. “What if the investigator accepts a bribe or tortures a suspect? Are we saying he cannot be held accountable as long as it’s not murder?” he asked. “That would be a serious breach of both our constitution and international human rights obligations.” Another unnamed member added, “We are practically saying that investigators can do anything short of killing—does this mean the ends justify the means? This is dangerous and unacceptable.” Government Justification In response to the criticism, Ato Issa Boru, Deputy Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Law and Justice, defended the amendment. “This is a complex issue. Special investigations often take place outside standard legal frameworks. The phrase ‘beyond one’s capacity and knowledge’ refers to extraordinary situations,” he explained. He emphasized that the clause aims to balance national security needs with individual accountability. “Of course, we must avoid abuse. That’s why we explicitly excluded murder from the immunity provision. But in the fight against terrorism, many countries adopt similarly strong laws,” Ato Issa said. He added that the law would still distinguish between acts committed “knowingly” and those carried out “negligently,” suggesting that only truly unavoidable actions would fall under the exemption. Nevertheless, critics argue that such distinctions are meaningless without clear judicial oversight and precise legal definitions. “In Ethiopia, where there is a long history of abuse by law enforcement, granting this kind of vague immunity is highly dangerous,” Ato Kassahun concluded. A Broader Debate The controversy highlights a broader tension in Ethiopian governance: the challenge of balancing security interests with the protection of human rights in an evolving legal landscape. As Ethiopia continues to reform its institutions, many warn that legal ambiguity—especially in security-related laws—can easily be exploited, unless anchored by transparent checks and balances. The debate surrounding this amendment may be far from over. Human rights advocates are already urging a review of the law, warning that without tighter legal safeguards, the country risks sliding into a regime of impunity under the guise of national security.