Ethiopia’s Parliament Repeals Controversial Immunity for Undercover Investigators Committing Crimes Except Murder

Ethiopia’s Parliament Repeals Controversial Immunity for Undercover Investigators Committing Crimes Except Murder Parliament has repealed a controversial legal provision that exempted undercover investigators from criminal liability for offenses committed in the line of duty—excluding murder. Critics argued the clause could be interpreted too broadly and undermine the rule of law. The provision was originally part of the Proclamation on the Prevention and Control of the Crime of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism, which amended a 12-year-old law and was approved by Parliament on June 10, 2017 E.C. Under the original text, “a person assigned to carry out undercover investigations or to perform arrests under cover shall not be subject to criminal prosecution for any criminal act committed while on duty, for reasons beyond his/her control and against his/her will, except for the crime of murder.” This clause faced strong criticism from opposition party members and human rights advocates, who warned it could enable abuses of power, weaken accountability, and lead to serious human rights violations. When it was introduced, the House of People’s Representatives’ Legal and Justice Affairs Committee defended the provision as necessary to make “special investigations more effective.” The Standing Committee justified it by arguing that officers using “special investigative methods” were acting in the public interest and needed legal protection to carry out their duties without fear of prosecution. However, concerns over the vague language and potential misuse of the exemption persisted. At a special session of the House of Representatives on Monday, June 30, the Standing Committee formally submitted a resolution to repeal the clause. Ato Isa Boru, deputy chairman of the committee, explained to Parliament that the provision risked being interpreted too broadly and could negatively impact the law’s enforcement. He emphasized that since the amended proclamation had not yet been officially published, the repeal was being submitted in time to remove the problematic clause before implementation. The repeal aims to ensure that the legal framework for combating money laundering and terrorism financing remains robust, transparent, and consistent with human rights standards, without offering blanket immunity to law enforcement officers engaged in covert operations.

Contesting the Politics of Statistics in Ethiopia

Contesting the Politics of Statistics in Ethiopia By Eyob Asfaw On July 3, 2025, PM Abiy addressed the House of Peoples’ Representatives, where he shared his quantitative figures quite liberally. The question of what these figures mean—and what they do not—captivated my mind, as I want to make sense of them as a student of Development. It is not uncommon to build a consensus that numbers and quantitative presentations represent objective reality. Although the figures and statistics went largely unnoticed in news headlines, PM Abiy’s address on numbers is no less contested than his positions on violence, inter-party, and regional politics. If someone were tasked with issuing a report card for PM Abiy, what passing mark would they give him, and how would they rate his performance in disclosing statistical data? This is a topic worth discussing. In this piece, I will highlight the contestability of government figures. Recently, I sought advice from a professional working in one of the government ministries about the quality of data from government sources. Positioned to collect and aggregate data from different sectors, he expressed reservations about administrative data. He openly asked, “How can a university supervisor easily accept data from administrative bodies when its trustworthiness is in question, given that sometimes the data is inflated?” In this context, the seminal work of the seasoned statistics professor Philip Hauser is instructive. He contended that, despite its potential to create pressure for policy and action, government-generated statistics often end up clouded by political smoke. One dominant narrative holds that the government is the chief supplier of state-based statistics and that this offsets the politics surrounding them. In the domestic context, my notes from PM Abiy’s speech include claims such as the export of 37 tons of gold; 13 million tourists visiting Unity Park; Ethiopian Airlines acquiring 13 aircraft; and earning 8.3 billion USD from the service sector out of a total of 32 billion USD in foreign exchange. Meanwhile, his administration is facing an outstanding 300 billion birr trade imbalance, and 46,000 taxpayers reported a zero balance for tax exemption. Nonetheless, these and other undisclosed figures are, debatably, enough to gauge his administration’s performance—and PM Abiy’s report card might even be promoted to distinction. As usual, PM Abiy offered a well-rehearsed response to criticism over the Ethiopian budget’s decline in USD terms. He provocatively said, “I commend you parliamentarians to measure growth neither in birr nor in forex, but in quintals of products.” This response makes some sense as a way to dilute the overemphasis on financial economics and the fixation on nominal macroeconomic indicators. From the vantage point of Economics 101, what matters most are aggregate outputs of land, resources, capital, labor, and entrepreneurship, rather than their nominal cash values. PM Abiy also addressed tax compliance. Beyond the 37 percent of loyal taxpayers, he advised the rest to cultivate the habit of paying taxes instead of disguising income through the informal economy, engaging in tax evasion, or reporting zero or negative balances. His approach here is softer rather than harsh toward the non-compliant business community. Given that wage-earning and public employees are generally loyal taxpayers, one might expect him to react more bitterly, instead of merely encouraging business owners to “love their country.” Stronger regulation seems more important to ensure compliance. On another point, he mentioned that 40 percent of tax is collected from public enterprises. What does that mean? Isn’t this growth counterproductive to the promise of the Homegrown Economic Reforms, which vow to make the private sector the frontline driver of economic growth? I think this requires further consideration by the top echelon of government to close the gap between economic policy and practice. Regarding job creation, PM Abiy defended his administration’s claim of creating 4.5 million jobs per year. But isn’t that figure inflated for a country with annual labor-force growth of 2.5–3%? From the demand and supply sides of the labor market, one might ask: Where do the extra 2 million jobs come from? Is the government truly outperforming, given that the Afrobarometer 2024 Survey reported that 74% of Ethiopians are dissatisfied with the government’s job-creation efforts? Setting aside my deeper analysis of the sectoral composition of employment for my dissertation, at this point I simply want to ask whether the Ministry of Labor and Skills misled him. I think these statistics deserve a second look by PM Abiy’s administration—or else, perhaps, double-counting of employment is on the rise. In reality, the unemployment rate can be considered normal if it stays around the global average of 5%. Scholars argue that unemployment can never be fully eliminated from an economy—just as inflation cannot. In sum, I am reminded of what one of my professors used to say: “Listen to all sides of any contestation, think critically, but always aim for balance.” It is difficult to either accept without question or completely dismiss what PM Abiy addressed before parliament. However, counterbalancing government-released figures will always be essential for sustaining and ensuring inclusive economic growth. Eyob Asfaw (eyob.asfaw@aau.edu.et) is a staff member at Addis Ababa University and currently a PhD candidate in Sustainable Development at CSD, AAU. 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Beyond the Law: Ethiopia Approves Shocking Immunity for Investigators—Except for Murder

Beyond the Law: Ethiopia Approves Shocking Immunity for Investigators—Except for Murder Ethiopia’s House of People’s Representatives has approved a controversial amendment to the country’s longstanding anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism proclamation, sparking strong criticism from legal experts and parliamentarians who warn that the changes could enable serious human rights violations. The amendment, passed on Tuesday, modifies a key provision in the 58-article proclamation first enacted in 2005 to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The specific revision grants broad immunity to individuals conducting undercover investigations—shielding them from criminal prosecution for acts committed “beyond their capacity” or “without their authorization,” with the sole exception of murder. Broad Immunity for Undercover Agents According to the newly amended provision, an individual engaged in a special investigative procedure cannot be held criminally liable for any offense other than murder, even if their actions would otherwise constitute a serious crime, provided they acted beyond their capacity or without explicit consent. The explanatory note submitted to parliament rationalized this immunity by asserting that such investigators act “in the public interest,” and should be protected if they unintentionally commit crimes in the course of duty. The change has proven divisive among lawmakers. Critics argue that the vague language and absence of limits on the types of crimes covered under the immunity clause effectively grant investigators unchecked powers with minimal accountability. Legal Experts Sound the Alarm Speaking to the BBC, prominent human rights advocate Yared Hailemariam, Director General of the Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center, condemned the amendment. He warned that the provision could serve as a legal shield for grave abuses, including torture and inhumane treatment. “This clause opens the door to human rights abuses,” Yared stated. “By not explicitly prohibiting excessive use of force or torture, the law gives a green light to acts that could cause permanent physical or psychological harm.” He also criticized the ambiguous phrasing “except for murder,” questioning whether other serious crimes—such as torture during interrogation—could now be treated as legally permissible. “The failure to clearly state what is off-limits, such as torture, is deeply concerning. This omission provides legal cover for intentional or unintentional abuse by investigators,” Yared added. International criminal law expert Ato Kassahun Molla Yilma echoed these concerns. “The provision lacks a requirement for prior judicial or executive authorization, which is a basic safeguard in comparable legal systems,” he explained. “Other countries demand that potentially illegal investigative acts be approved by a court or senior authority. Without such mechanisms, there is no oversight.” Kassahun noted that international human rights treaties—many of which Ethiopia is a signatory to—explicitly prohibit torture, inhumane, and degrading treatment under any circumstances. “The absence of a clear list of non-derogable crimes undermines Ethiopia’s obligations under international law,” he said. He further criticized the subjective language of the amendment, particularly the phrase “beyond his or her capacity,” calling it legally vague. “This introduces dangerous gaps in interpretation. In other jurisdictions, legal standards like ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ guide such immunities. Ethiopia’s law, in contrast, leaves too much room for abuse,” Kassahun warned. Concerns from Parliament Members The amendment also drew skepticism from several members of the House during the parliamentary session. Dr. Alemu Gonfa, a representative from the ruling Prosperity Party in Oromia’s Dano constituency, questioned the logic of granting such sweeping immunity. “It doesn’t seem right to declare that someone should never be prosecuted for a crime,” Dr. Alemu said. “If we want to protect investigators, we must clearly define that only actions within their legal mandate are covered—not all criminal acts.” Dr. Desalegn Chane, a representative of the opposition Amhara National Movement, voiced similar worries. “What if the investigator accepts a bribe or tortures a suspect? Are we saying he cannot be held accountable as long as it’s not murder?” he asked. “That would be a serious breach of both our constitution and international human rights obligations.” Another unnamed member added, “We are practically saying that investigators can do anything short of killing—does this mean the ends justify the means? This is dangerous and unacceptable.” Government Justification In response to the criticism, Ato Issa Boru, Deputy Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Law and Justice, defended the amendment. “This is a complex issue. Special investigations often take place outside standard legal frameworks. The phrase ‘beyond one’s capacity and knowledge’ refers to extraordinary situations,” he explained. He emphasized that the clause aims to balance national security needs with individual accountability. “Of course, we must avoid abuse. That’s why we explicitly excluded murder from the immunity provision. But in the fight against terrorism, many countries adopt similarly strong laws,” Ato Issa said. He added that the law would still distinguish between acts committed “knowingly” and those carried out “negligently,” suggesting that only truly unavoidable actions would fall under the exemption. Nevertheless, critics argue that such distinctions are meaningless without clear judicial oversight and precise legal definitions. “In Ethiopia, where there is a long history of abuse by law enforcement, granting this kind of vague immunity is highly dangerous,” Ato Kassahun concluded. A Broader Debate The controversy highlights a broader tension in Ethiopian governance: the challenge of balancing security interests with the protection of human rights in an evolving legal landscape. As Ethiopia continues to reform its institutions, many warn that legal ambiguity—especially in security-related laws—can easily be exploited, unless anchored by transparent checks and balances. The debate surrounding this amendment may be far from over. Human rights advocates are already urging a review of the law, warning that without tighter legal safeguards, the country risks sliding into a regime of impunity under the guise of national security.

Mengistu Haile Mariam at 88: Reflecting on the Legacy of Ethiopia’s Most Controversial Revolutionary

Mengistu Haile Mariam at 88: Reflecting on the Legacy of Ethiopia’s Most Controversial Revolutionary Mengistu Haile Mariam: Ethiopia’s Revolutionary Strongman and the Legacy of Power in Exile Mengistu Haile Mariam, born on May 21, 1937, is a figure etched deeply into Ethiopia’s 20th-century political history. As the leader of the Derg, a Marxist-Leninist military junta, Mengistu ushered in a brutal new era following the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie. His regime brought revolutionary reforms and sweeping changes—but also mass executions, civil war, and famine. While many leaders of such magnitude fall in battle or face trial, Mengistu remains a rare exception: a deposed ruler who continues to live in exile, unrepentant and protected. The Rise of a Revolutionary Soldier Born into a modest family in southern Ethiopia, Mengistu rose through the military ranks during a time of mounting unrest under Haile Selassie’s imperial rule. His education abroad, including military training in the United States, exposed him to global revolutionary currents and deepened his resentment of Ethiopia’s rigid class system. In 1974, amid famine, economic turmoil, and popular protests, a military coup deposed the emperor. A group of junior officers formed the Derg, and Mengistu emerged as one of its most radical and ambitious leaders. The 60s Massacre: Birth of a Regime Through Blood Mengistu’s revolutionary zeal was quickly matched by his ruthlessness. In November 1974, the Derg executed 60 former imperial officials—including ministers, generals, and members of the royal court—without trial. The announcement was broadcast nationwide, shocking the Ethiopian public and signaling the arrival of a regime that would consolidate power through fear and violence. This event, now referred to as the “60s massacre,” was both a symbolic break from the monarchy and a prelude to the terror that would define Mengistu’s rule. From Red Terror to Famine Mengistu formally assumed leadership in 1977, following the assassination or purging of his rivals. His infamous speech in Meskel Square—where he smashed bottles of red liquid to represent the blood of “counter-revolutionaries”—heralded the onset of the Red Terror. Over the next few years, thousands of students, intellectuals, and perceived dissenters were imprisoned, tortured, or killed. The scale of brutality shocked the nation. Corpses were left in public spaces as warnings, and grieving families were often forced to pay for the bullets used in executions. At the same time, Mengistu’s government imposed collectivized agricultural policies and launched massive forced resettlement programs. These projects, combined with war and environmental factors, contributed to the 1984–1985 famine, one of the deadliest humanitarian disasters of the 20th century. While global relief efforts surged, the regime obstructed aid to rebel-held areas and used food as a weapon of war. The Fall: Collapse of a Revolution By the late 1980s, Ethiopia was engulfed in civil war. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) advanced in the north, and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), gained momentum in the heartland. Internationally, the fall of the Soviet Union, Mengistu’s primary backer, left his regime diplomatically and financially isolated. In May 1991, as rebel forces closed in on Addis Ababa, Mengistu fled the country. His departure marked the collapse of the Derg and the end of Ethiopia’s experiment with Soviet-style socialism. Life in Exile: A Dictator Sheltered Mengistu fled first to Kenya, then secured asylum in Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe, who admired his anti-Western stance. Since then, he has lived in Harare, where he is reportedly protected by Zimbabwean security and continues to receive state housing and benefits. In 2006, an Ethiopian court found Mengistu guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity after a 12-year trial conducted in absentia. His sentence was first life imprisonment, later revised to death in 2008. Despite international pressure, Zimbabwe has refused to extradite him, claiming he remains a “guest of the state.” In exile, Mengistu has remained largely silent, issuing only rare public statements. Reports suggest he has advised Zimbabwean security forces and continued to defend his past, insisting that his actions were necessary to protect Ethiopia’s revolution. Contested Legacy Mengistu’s legacy continues to divide Ethiopians. Supporters view him as a radical reformer who dismantled a centuries-old feudal system, challenged imperialism, and tried to forge an independent socialist path for Africa. They credit him with land reform, nationalization, and attempts at modernization. Critics, however, see him as a dictator responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, the misuse of aid during famine, the suppression of dissent, and the prolonging of Ethiopia’s internal conflicts. For many, especially survivors of the Red Terror and the 1980s famine, Mengistu’s name remains synonymous with pain and terror. His presence in exile is a sore point in Ethiopian memory politics: a man sentenced for crimes against humanity, yet living freely without accountability. Conclusion: Ethiopia’s Unfinished Reckoning Mengistu Haile Mariam embodies the paradoxes of postcolonial Africa: revolutionary zeal turned authoritarianism, dreams of liberation overshadowed by repression, and a leader who wielded enormous power yet fled when the tide turned. His rule left deep scars—on Ethiopia’s economy, political culture, and collective psyche. Today, as Ethiopia confronts questions about national unity, justice, and historical accountability, Mengistu’s shadow still looms. His comfortable exile in Zimbabwe, despite a court-issued death sentence, is a testament to both the resilience of impunity and the complexity of transitional justice in Africa. Mengistu’s legacy—like Ethiopia itself—is still being written. But what is clear is that the revolution he led came at a cost the nation is still reckoning with.

U.S. Senator Marco Rubio Cancels Planned Visit to Addis Ababa

U.S. Senator Marco Rubio Cancels Planned Visit to Addis Ababa U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, who also serves as a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has reportedly canceled his scheduled diplomatic visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Nairobi, Kenya. The decision to call off the trip was confirmed just hours after Kenyan President William Ruto announced a five-day state visit to China. According to a report from Africa Intelligence, Rubio’s planned tour to the African continent was set to be his first official visit to the region and was expected to focus on security cooperation and trade relations—two critical areas of interest in U.S.-Africa engagement. However, the visit has now been postponed indefinitely, and no new date has been confirmed. The cancellation has drawn attention in light of ongoing shifts in geopolitical alliances and trade relations across Africa. President Ruto’s concurrent diplomatic engagement with China, a key economic and strategic competitor to the United States in Africa, has raised questions about Kenya’s evolving foreign policy priorities and the broader implications for U.S. influence in the region. U.S.–Ethiopia Trade Tensions The now-canceled visit also comes amid strained trade relations between the United States and Ethiopia. Under former President Donald Trump’s administration, Ethiopia was among 185 countries that faced harsh trade tariffs. These measures were part of broader policy shifts that saw developing countries lose preferential access to U.S. markets. Beginning April 5, 2025, all Ethiopian exports entering the U.S. are subject to a 10% base tariff. This represents a significant barrier for Ethiopian businesses that once benefitted from trade incentives under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which Ethiopia was suspended from in 2021 due to alleged human rights concerns during the Tigray conflict. Diplomatic Uncertainty and Regional Competition Rubio’s canceled trip is viewed as a setback for efforts to restore and strengthen U.S. engagement in the Horn of Africa, particularly with Ethiopia, a long-time strategic partner. With Ethiopia seeking new economic allies and deepening ties with countries like China, Turkey, and Russia, the diplomatic vacuum left by the U.S. could widen. Experts suggest that the indefinite postponement reflects both logistical concerns and deeper uncertainties in the U.S.-Africa policy agenda, especially as African nations increasingly diversify their international partnerships. In the current context, the decision signals a potentially missed opportunity for the U.S. to reassert its commitment to Africa amid intensifying global competition.

Ethiopia’s Corridor Development Project: Progress or Human Rights Catastrophe?

Ethiopia’s Corridor Development Project: Progress or Human Rights Catastrophe? April 2025 As Ethiopia pushes forward with its ambitious Corridor Development Project (CDP), a sweeping urban transformation initiative meant to modernize 58 cities, it is facing serious accusations of human rights abuses. Amnesty International, in its damning report titled “Ethiopia: Federal Government Must Pause the Corridor Development Project and End Forced Evictions” (Index AFR 25/9098/2025, April 2025), paints a troubling picture of widespread forced evictions, inadequate legal safeguards, and government repression. A Bold Vision Overshadowed by Displacement Launched in late 2022 and formally approved in February 2024, the CDP is designed to improve infrastructure, attract investment, create jobs, and enhance urban living. According to the Addis Ababa City Administration, it promises “urban transformation,” linking city projects across sprawling urban corridors. However, Amnesty International’s investigation reveals a dark underbelly to this vision. The project has already led to the forced eviction of at least 872 people in the Bole and Lemi Kura sub-cities of Addis Ababa, including 254 homeowners and 618 tenants. The evictions were carried out without prior consultation, compensation, or provision of alternative housing. Amnesty warns the actual number of displaced may be far higher given that 29 hectares of land were cleared in these sub-cities alone. Forced Evictions: Unprecedented and Unlawful Forced eviction—defined under international law as the involuntary removal of individuals from their homes without legal protections—has become increasingly widespread in Ethiopia. Victims report being notified orally just 24 to 72 hours before demolition. No written notices were issued, and community meetings provided no clarity or resolution. Amnesty interviewed 47 household heads, all of whom confirmed their homes had been demolished and that they received no compensation. Many lived in “Sened Alba” houses—structures lacking full land title but recognized by local authorities. This legal grey area has been manipulated by the government to deny compensation. One community leader documented 180 households that were evicted, none of whom received restitution. The Human Toll: Livelihoods, Education, Mental Health The consequences of these evictions go beyond physical displacement. Many residents lost rental income, their primary source of livelihood. Families that once earned between 800 and 70,000 ETB (approximately USD 7 to 564) per month now face economic ruin. School-age children have dropped out, unable to afford tuition or commute from distant rental units. Mental health concerns are rampant. “I am now evicted from my Idir and my children are dealing with mental health challenges,” said one evictee. The destruction of social institutions like Idir (community-based welfare associations) has led to isolation and psychological trauma. Women, children, and the elderly—often dependent on neighborhood networks for support—are disproportionately affected. Silencing Dissent: Journalists and Activists Targeted Amnesty also highlights increasing repression against journalists and human rights defenders. Reporters trying to cover CDP-related evictions have been harassed or threatened. In one high-profile case, renowned artist Azeb Worku was arrested in September 2024 for criticizing the demolitions [Amnesty, 2025]. The government has also suspended civil society organizations that attempted to document or protest the evictions, creating a climate of fear and self-censorship. Violations of International Human Rights Law Amnesty International asserts that the Ethiopian government has violated multiple international human rights obligations: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 25): Right to adequate housing. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 11): Guarantees housing rights. African Union Kampala Convention (Article X): Prohibits displacement from public/private development without safeguards. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights mandates that evictions occur only after: Genuine consultation with those affected. Adequate written notice. Legal remedies and compensation. No one is rendered homeless or vulnerable. None of these standards were met in the CDP rollouts. Government Response: Contradictions and Denial Despite public outcry, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has downplayed concerns. In January 2025, he claimed that “15,000 evictees in Jimma have not demanded compensation” [Ethiopia Observer, Jan 2025]. Minister Chaltu Sani later said demolitions were halted, yet Amnesty’s findings show continued activity. These contradictory statements reveal a lack of coherence and accountability in how the government is handling the CDP. Recommendations from Amnesty International Amnesty International calls for immediate action: Suspend all evictions and halt the CDP until human rights safeguards are in place. Conduct an independent human rights impact assessment. Provide alternative housing and full compensation to affected persons. Allow visits from UN Special Rapporteurs on adequate housing. Enable civic and journalistic oversight of development projects. They also call on development partners and regional bodies like the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to hold Ethiopia accountable. Conclusion: A Crossroads for Development Ethiopia’s CDP may be a milestone in urban development, but if executed without justice, consultation, and compassion, it risks becoming a humanitarian disaster. The government stands at a crossroads: reform the CDP with human rights at its core, or continue down a path of exclusion, repression, and instability. Urban renewal must not come at the cost of basic human dignity. The people displaced are not obstacles to progress—they are citizens, families, and communities who deserve a voice in shaping Ethiopia’s future. Citations: Amnesty International. (2025). Ethiopia: Federal Government Must Pause the Corridor Development Project and End Forced Evictions (AFR 25/9098/2025). https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/9098/2025/en/

Seven Years of Abiy Ahmed’s Leadership: A Complex Legacy of Hope, Conflict, and Controversy

Seven Years of Abiy Ahmed’s Leadership: A Complex Legacy of Hope, Conflict, and Controversy On April 2, 2018, at just 41 years old, Abiy Ahmed Ali became the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, a country long defined by its intricate ethnic politics and authoritarian rule. His ascent marked a dramatic shift, one that seemed to promise a new era for the Horn of Africa’s second-most populous nation. Abiy’s arrival was heralded not only as a change of leadership but as the dawn of a new political and social order—an order based on unity, democratization, and, perhaps most surprisingly, peace. His early actions, such as releasing political prisoners, allowing greater press freedom, and pursuing an end to Ethiopia’s long-standing conflict with Eritrea, led to euphoria. He won the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, cementing his status as an international beacon of hope. Yet seven years later, that hope is entangled with profound disillusionment. Abiy’s tenure, once seen as transformative, has descended into a period marked by war, ethnic strife, and growing authoritarianism. The optimism that once defined his rise to power is now counterbalanced by accusations of militarized repression, civil war, and political consolidation that threatens the country’s democratic aspirations. Ethiopia’s future under Abiy Ahmed remains uncertain, as his leadership is defined by both extraordinary achievements and overwhelming failures. The Early Years: A Visionary or Just a Leader in Crisis? Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power was shaped by the political convulsions that gripped Ethiopia in the mid-2010s. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the coalition that had ruled the country since 1991, found itself besieged by widespread protests. These protests were led largely by the Oromo and Amhara populations, who had long felt marginalized despite the country’s strong economic growth. Abiy, a former intelligence officer and the son of an Oromo Muslim father and a Christian mother, emerged as the surprise compromise candidate within the EPRDF leadership. His assumption of power was marked by a palpable sense of hope. Abiy’s early reforms were unprecedented: Tens of thousands of political prisoners were released, Media restrictions were loosened, Exiled opposition groups were invited to return. Abiy’s appointment of a gender-balanced cabinet was a symbol of inclusivity, while his creation of a Ministry of Peace reflected a commitment to national healing. But it was his bold peace deal with Eritrea in July 2018, ending a bitter 20-year border conflict, that propelled him onto the international stage. The agreement, and his subsequent receipt of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, positioned him as a peacemaker—a leader capable of ending one of Africa’s longest-standing conflicts. To many, Abiy represented a new Ethiopia, one free of the divisive politics that had long plagued the nation. Yet even in the midst of this optimism, cracks were beginning to form. Abiy’s message of medemer, or “synergy,” promised unity across Ethiopia’s more than 80 ethnic groups, but it soon became clear that his vision for reconciliation would not be easily realized. In his push for national harmony, Abiy found himself navigating a landmine of ethnic tensions, historical grievances, and competing political agendas. The Descent: Tigray, Ethnic Tensions, and Civil War By November 2020, the euphoria surrounding Abiy’s leadership had begun to erode as he became embroiled in the conflict in Tigray. What started as a “law enforcement operation” against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—once the dominant faction within the ruling EPRDF coalition—spiraled into a brutal civil war. The conflict, now known as the Tigray War, drew in Eritrean forces and Amhara militias as allies of the federal government. The war quickly became catastrophic. The human toll was staggering: 600,000+ deaths from violence, famine, and disease, Sexual violence, with nearly 10% of women in Tigray affected, according to reports from the British Medical Journal, Millions displaced, with the conflict exacerbating existing humanitarian crises. Abiy’s earlier image as a reformer and peacemaker was severely tarnished as reports of atrocities—massacres, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement—surfaced. The involvement of Eritrean forces, notorious for their brutal tactics, led to widespread international condemnation. For many Ethiopians, the Tigray War marked a tragic turning point, as the very leader who had promised unity seemed to deepen the divisions in his country. The war in Tigray was not an isolated incident. In the Oromia region, where Abiy hails from, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) launched a guerilla campaign, accusing Abiy of betraying Oromo interests by centralizing power and sidelining ethnic concerns. Meanwhile, in Amhara, dissatisfaction brewed after the Tigray conflict, especially over territorial disputes. Wolkait and Raya, contested areas in the north, became flashpoints for further unrest. By early 2025, 4.4 million people had been displaced, and 21.4 million remained in need of humanitarian assistance. Ethiopia, under Abiy, was a nation fractured by war and deepening ethnic strife, a country increasingly defined by displacement and suffering. Economic Reform and Struggle: The Promise of Growth Abiy inherited an economy that had been one of Africa’s fastest-growing. Under the previous government, Ethiopia had achieved impressive growth rates, averaging 10% annually for more than a decade. Yet Abiy’s transition from a state-led model to a more market-oriented economy has proven to be fraught with challenges. His privatization agenda—which included the sale of state-owned giants like Ethiopian Airlines and Ethio Telecom—was designed to attract foreign investment and modernize the economy. Abiy’s government also boasted of turning Ethiopia into Africa’s “breadbasket,” claiming self-sufficiency in wheat by 2023. However, Abiy’s economic reforms have been undermined by the conflicts that ravaged the country. The Tigray War alone is estimated to have cost billions, while Ethiopia’s currency has plunged, and inflation has skyrocketed. As Abiy pursued grand infrastructural projects—such as a $10 billion palace and a new science museum—critics accused him of prioritizing symbolic grandeur over addressing the immediate needs of his people. The economic gap between ambition and reality is stark. Despite claims of progress, many Ethiopians face food insecurity, with war-torn regions like Tigray struggling to recover from the devastation. Abiy’s inability to stabilize the economy amid these crises has become a central point of contention in his leadership. From Peacemaker to Expansionist: Abiy’s Foreign Policy Shift Abiy’s foreign policy trajectory mirrors his domestic one—transformative at first, but increasingly fraught with risk. His peace deal with Eritrea was a significant achievement, but relations with Eritrea deteriorated after 2022, as Abiy sought access to the Red Sea—a critical economic lifeline for landlocked Ethiopia. His ambition to break the nation’s dependence on Djibouti for trade led him to propose economic incentives for port access, including shares in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Abiy’s rhetoric grew more expansionist. He spoke of merging Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia into a powerful regional bloc. But these aspirations raised concerns among neighboring countries, fueling fears of a revived imperial Ethiopia. As Eritrea mobilized its forces, and tensions mounted, Abiy’s aggressive posture further destabilized an already volatile region. Authoritarian Tendencies: The Struggle for Power While Abiy’s initial reforms suggested a break with Ethiopia’s authoritarian past, his rule has increasingly been characterized by backsliding. By 2022, media censorship had returned, journalists and activists were detained, and internet shutdowns became common tools of control. Human rights organizations accused Abiy of using state violence to suppress dissent, particularly through Koree Nageenyaa, a secret service in Oromia responsible for alleged unlawful detentions and extrajudicial killings. The 2021 election, which secured Abiy a second term, was marred by opposition boycotts and violence. Western governments, including the United States, decried the election as deeply flawed, citing the detention of opposition leaders like Jawar Mohammed. In recent months, reports have surfaced suggesting that Abiy plans to further consolidate power through a constitutional overhaul, shifting Ethiopia from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, potentially extending his rule until 2037. A Legacy at a Crossroads Seven years after Abiy Ahmed assumed office, Ethiopia finds itself at a crossroads. A nation once filled with hope now grapples with the brutal consequences of war, economic mismanagement, and political repression. Abiy’s legacy is defined by a series of contradictions: A Nobel Peace Prize laureate who presided over one of the most deadly conflicts of the 21st century, A reformer whose policies fostered political and ethnic divisions, A unifier whose vision of a united Ethiopia now seems increasingly distant. Abiy’s greatest challenge now lies in navigating the crises that have come to define his tenure. Will he manage to broker lasting peace in the Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regions? Can he prioritize the immediate humanitarian needs of the Ethiopian people over his grander political and economic ambitions? And, crucially, will he restore the democratic promise that once made him Ethiopia’s beacon of hope? As Ethiopia stands at this crossroads, its future depends on the answers to these questions. For Abiy, history will be the judge—and the judgment, for better or worse, is far from settled.

A Decade Later: Sudan’s True Stance on the Renaissance Dam

A Decade Later: Sudan’s True Stance on the Renaissance Dam By- Asrat Berhanu Today marks exactly 10 years since Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia signed the historic Declaration of Principles (DoP) on the Renaissance Dam. Yet, despite clear, documented support from Sudan, misinformation continues to thrive, primarily from Egyptian sources. Let’s uncover the reality behind Sudan’s stance with clarity, numbers, and history: Back in December 2013, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir openly declared Sudan’s unwavering support for Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam. Fast forward to 2021, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok reaffirmed this support, even announcing Sudan’s plans to undertake new enhancements to the dam at Roseires, leveraging the consistent flow promised by GERD. Why, then, are the Egyptians repeatedly misled into believing Sudan opposes GERD? Because acknowledging Sudan’s support shatters Egypt’s narrative that it’s not alone in opposition. Here are the undisputed facts: Sudan’s Substantial Benefits from GERD: Stable and Consistent Blue Nile Flow: GERD will regulate the Blue Nile’s flow, significantly benefiting Sudanese agriculture. Experts estimate Sudan can expand irrigation, increasing agricultural productivity through multiple harvest cycles per year. Protection Against Floods: Remember the devastating 2020 floods in Sudan? GERD will regulate those unpredictable, destructive flows, providing critical flood protection to millions of Sudanese. Freedom from the 1959 Agreement: GERD practically nullifies the restrictive 1959 Nile water-sharing agreement, empowering Sudan to independently construct additional dams without Egyptian interference. Water Recovery: Sudan previously lost roughly 6 billion cubic meters of water annually, which flowed unused into Egypt. With GERD, Sudan can reclaim and effectively use this water, revolutionizing its agricultural and energy sectors. Sudan’s Tangible Contributions to GERD: Under President al-Bashir (1989–2019), Sudan didn’t just verbally support GERD—it backed words with actions. In 2011, Sudan donated over $10 million worth of heavy construction equipment, including bulldozers, excavators, and drilling machinery, directly aiding Ethiopia’s dam-building efforts. Strategic Collaboration: Sudan integrated its energy infrastructure with Ethiopia as early as 2014, benefiting from affordable electricity. Al-Bashir’s government even secured commitments for 200 MW of free power from Ethiopian dams, significantly enhancing Sudan’s energy capacity. Geopolitical Realignment: GERD’s emergence shifted Nile basin alliances. Sudan openly aligned with Ethiopia, distancing itself from Egypt’s traditionally dominant influence. This strategic pivot isolated Egypt, weakening Cairo’s longstanding grip on Nile politics. Clarifying Sudan’s Brief Alignment with Egypt (2021): Although Sudan has consistently supported GERD, transparency demands acknowledging the brief period in 2021 when Sudan’s transitional government, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, temporarily aligned politically with Egypt at the UN Security Council, calling for a legally binding agreement on GERD’s operations. This temporary alignment primarily resulted from internal political pressures, Egypt’s diplomatic maneuvers, and transitional instability after al-Bashir’s removal. Yet, even during this period, Sudan never outright opposed GERD’s construction, instead advocating for binding operational guidelines—something Ethiopia consistently agreed upon through diplomatic dialogue. Debunking the “Collapse Myth”: Despite sensational claims predominantly from Egyptian media, credible international studies and the International Panel of Experts have repeatedly confirmed GERD’s safety and structural integrity. Sudanese experts themselves dismiss collapse fears as unfounded propaganda. The Truth in the Declaration of Principles (2015): The DoP explicitly outlines mutual understanding: Egypt and Sudan acknowledged GERD’s developmental goals and agreed on equitable Nile water use. Both countries agreed to prioritize purchasing electricity from GERD. Egypt and Sudan praised Ethiopia’s compliance with international safety standards. They accepted Ethiopia’s sovereign right to manage dam operations, committing to diplomatic conflict resolution if disputes arise. A decade later, the evidence is clear: Despite a brief, politically motivated alignment with Egypt in 2021, Sudan’s foundational support for GERD remains robust, well-documented, and indisputable. GERD is not merely Ethiopia’s dam—it’s a regional catalyst benefiting Sudan immensely.

Ethiopia’s Asset Recovery Law: Security Officers Begin Abusing Power Before It’s Even Enforced

Ethiopia’s Asset Recovery Law: Security Officers Begin Abusing Power Before It’s Even Enforced The introduction of the Asset Recovery Proclamation in Ethiopia represents a significant step in the country’s anti-corruption strategy. The goal is to recover assets gained through illicit means and deter further corrupt practices within both the public and private sectors. However, the law’s potential for misuse, particularly in terms of targeting political opponents, critics, and ordinary citizens, is a serious concern. This analysis will examine how the Asset Recovery Proclamation could be weaponized for political purposes, using the case of four suspects recently charged with corruption-related offenses as a key example of how state mechanisms, including law enforcement, are already being used to target individuals—even before the law is fully enacted. 1. The Case of the Suspects: A Real-World Example of Preemptive Targeting The case of four suspects charged with threatening investors and accepting money under the pretext of invoking the Asset Recovery Proclamation highlights the danger of abuse in its implementation. The suspects, including police officers, were accused of using the threat of asset confiscation to extort money from individuals, even though the law had not yet been enacted and no formal investigation had begun. The defendants allegedly told an investor that his property was about to be seized under the new proclamation and coerced him into handing over 10,000 birr as a “payment” to prevent such action. This case serves as a stark example of how law enforcement officers may abuse the legal framework—before it is even fully functional—to exert control over individuals and extract money under false pretenses. The fact that police officers were involved in the extortion scheme suggests that state mechanisms designed to enforce the law could, in fact, become part of the problem, actively participating in corruption rather than eradicating it. Moreover, it indicates how quickly and easily the Asset Recovery Proclamation could be manipulated by individuals in positions of power to intimidate and target those without political or legal recourse. The indictment reveals that the suspects went further by claiming to be part of the security forces, which allowed them to extract a one-million birr check from the victim under the false pretense of handling asset confiscation. The fact that these individuals were able to engage in such activity with apparent impunity before the law was even in effect underscores the ease with which such laws can be abused by those with authority. This preemptive targeting of a private citizen illustrates a troubling trend—police officers and others in positions of power might be using the law to intimidate and financially exploit individuals, long before an official investigation or judicial process is even in motion. 2. The Broader Implications: Politicization of Anti-Corruption Measures The Asset Recovery Proclamation is framed as a mechanism to tackle corruption and illicit enrichment, but the case of the suspects underlines how such a law could easily be politicized. The law’s broad and somewhat vague provisions, coupled with a lack of clear guidelines on what constitutes “illicit wealth,” create an opening for political manipulation. Those in power could use the asset recovery process to target individuals based on their political views or affiliations, instead of focusing on actual criminal behavior. In the case of the suspects, the involvement of law enforcement officials who appear to be working with impunity signals a disturbing trend of politicized enforcement. The accused police officers, including an inspector from the Federal Police Commission, clearly used their positions to manipulate the situation for personal gain. This reflects the potential for similar abuses when the law is fully in force: law enforcement officials, government employees, or even political factions could use the proclamation as a political tool to target opposition figures, business rivals, or dissenting voices. Given Ethiopia’s political environment, where political competition can be intense and divisive, the risk of weaponizing the law to eliminate rivals or punish critics becomes a very real concern. The law could easily turn into a tool for silencing opposition or delegitimizing political competitors by accusing them of corrupt activities or illicit wealth accumulation without any credible evidence or investigation. 3. The Risk of Political Targeting and Unchecked Abuse The current case also highlights how the police, long before the law is enacted, have already begun using the perceived power of the Asset Recovery Proclamation to target individuals. The actions of the suspects suggest that the mere threat of asset confiscation under the proclamation is enough to exert control over others, particularly those without the resources to fight back or challenge such claims. This practice of leveraging an as-yet unimplemented law is alarming. If the law can be exploited even before its official enactment, it could be even more dangerous once fully operational. Individuals—especially those critical of the government or those in political opposition—could face unfounded accusations of corruption or illicit wealth accumulation, leading to asset seizures without due process or substantial evidence. A critical issue is that individuals accused under such laws might not have the resources to defend themselves. In a society where political and economic power is often intertwined, a vulnerable individual, or a business leader without political protection, might easily become a target. Their assets could be seized, their reputation tarnished, and their livelihood threatened—all in the name of asset recovery, without a fair trial or even a legitimate investigation. 4. Legal Safeguards: The Need for Transparency and Oversight The case of the suspects makes it clear that there needs to be robust safeguards to prevent the abuse of the Asset Recovery Proclamation. Without adequate oversight, this law could become yet another tool for state officials to suppress dissent and consolidate power. To ensure fairness and prevent political targeting, several measures should be put in place: Clear Legal Definitions: The law should clearly define what constitutes illicit wealth or corruption to prevent the arbitrary application of asset recovery measures. Independent Oversight: An independent body, free from political influence, should oversee the implementation of the law and investigate complaints of abuse. Judicial Review: Any asset seizure should require judicial approval, and the victims should have access to a fair and transparent legal process to contest the seizure. Transparency in Investigations: All asset recovery activities should be publicly documented, with clear evidence presented before any assets are confiscated. 5. Conclusion: A Tool for Justice or Political Suppression? The Asset Recovery Proclamation holds the potential to be a valuable tool in the fight against corruption, but the way it is implemented will determine whether it serves the public good or becomes a vehicle for political repression. The case of the suspects—who have already exploited the legal framework before its official enactment—serves as a cautionary tale of the dangers of unchecked power and the misuse of anti-corruption laws for political ends. To prevent such abuses, the law must be accompanied by strict safeguards, including judicial oversight, independent monitoring, and clear definitions, to ensure it does not become a tool for targeting individuals based on political motivations. Only with these measures in place can the Asset Recovery Proclamation fulfill its original intent—combating corruption—without becoming an instrument of political control.