Seven Years of Abiy Ahmed’s Leadership: A Complex Legacy of Hope, Conflict, and Controversy

On April 2, 2018, at just 41 years old, Abiy Ahmed Ali became the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, a country long defined by its intricate ethnic politics and authoritarian rule. His ascent marked a dramatic shift, one that seemed to promise a new era for the Horn of Africa’s second-most populous nation. Abiy’s arrival was heralded not only as a change of leadership but as the dawn of a new political and social order—an order based on unity, democratization, and, perhaps most surprisingly, peace. His early actions, such as releasing political prisoners, allowing greater press freedom, and pursuing an end to Ethiopia’s long-standing conflict with Eritrea, led to euphoria. He won the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, cementing his status as an international beacon of hope. Yet seven years later, that hope is entangled with profound disillusionment. Abiy’s tenure, once seen as transformative, has descended into a period marked by war, ethnic strife, and growing authoritarianism. The optimism that once defined his rise to power is now counterbalanced by accusations of militarized repression, civil war, and political consolidation that threatens the country’s democratic aspirations. Ethiopia’s future under Abiy Ahmed remains uncertain, as his leadership is defined by both extraordinary achievements and overwhelming failures. Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power was shaped by the political convulsions that gripped Ethiopia in the mid-2010s. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the coalition that had ruled the country since 1991, found itself besieged by widespread protests. These protests were led largely by the Oromo and Amhara populations, who had long felt marginalized despite the country’s strong economic growth. Abiy, a former intelligence officer and the son of an Oromo Muslim father and a Christian mother, emerged as the surprise compromise candidate within the EPRDF leadership. His assumption of power was marked by a palpable sense of hope. Abiy’s early reforms were unprecedented: Abiy’s appointment of a gender-balanced cabinet was a symbol of inclusivity, while his creation of a Ministry of Peace reflected a commitment to national healing. But it was his bold peace deal with Eritrea in July 2018, ending a bitter 20-year border conflict, that propelled him onto the international stage. The agreement, and his subsequent receipt of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, positioned him as a peacemaker—a leader capable of ending one of Africa’s longest-standing conflicts. To many, Abiy represented a new Ethiopia, one free of the divisive politics that had long plagued the nation. Yet even in the midst of this optimism, cracks were beginning to form. Abiy’s message of medemer, or “synergy,” promised unity across Ethiopia’s more than 80 ethnic groups, but it soon became clear that his vision for reconciliation would not be easily realized. In his push for national harmony, Abiy found himself navigating a landmine of ethnic tensions, historical grievances, and competing political agendas. By November 2020, the euphoria surrounding Abiy’s leadership had begun to erode as he became embroiled in the conflict in Tigray. What started as a “law enforcement operation” against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—once the dominant faction within the ruling EPRDF coalition—spiraled into a brutal civil war. The conflict, now known as the Tigray War, drew in Eritrean forces and Amhara militias as allies of the federal government. The war quickly became catastrophic. The human toll was staggering: Abiy’s earlier image as a reformer and peacemaker was severely tarnished as reports of atrocities—massacres, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement—surfaced. The involvement of Eritrean forces, notorious for their brutal tactics, led to widespread international condemnation. For many Ethiopians, the Tigray War marked a tragic turning point, as the very leader who had promised unity seemed to deepen the divisions in his country. The war in Tigray was not an isolated incident. In the Oromia region, where Abiy hails from, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) launched a guerilla campaign, accusing Abiy of betraying Oromo interests by centralizing power and sidelining ethnic concerns. Meanwhile, in Amhara, dissatisfaction brewed after the Tigray conflict, especially over territorial disputes. Wolkait and Raya, contested areas in the north, became flashpoints for further unrest. By early 2025, 4.4 million people had been displaced, and 21.4 million remained in need of humanitarian assistance. Ethiopia, under Abiy, was a nation fractured by war and deepening ethnic strife, a country increasingly defined by displacement and suffering. Abiy inherited an economy that had been one of Africa’s fastest-growing. Under the previous government, Ethiopia had achieved impressive growth rates, averaging 10% annually for more than a decade. Yet Abiy’s transition from a state-led model to a more market-oriented economy has proven to be fraught with challenges. His privatization agenda—which included the sale of state-owned giants like Ethiopian Airlines and Ethio Telecom—was designed to attract foreign investment and modernize the economy. Abiy’s government also boasted of turning Ethiopia into Africa’s “breadbasket,” claiming self-sufficiency in wheat by 2023. However, Abiy’s economic reforms have been undermined by the conflicts that ravaged the country. The Tigray War alone is estimated to have cost billions, while Ethiopia’s currency has plunged, and inflation has skyrocketed. As Abiy pursued grand infrastructural projects—such as a $10 billion palace and a new science museum—critics accused him of prioritizing symbolic grandeur over addressing the immediate needs of his people. The economic gap between ambition and reality is stark. Despite claims of progress, many Ethiopians face food insecurity, with war-torn regions like Tigray struggling to recover from the devastation. Abiy’s inability to stabilize the economy amid these crises has become a central point of contention in his leadership. Abiy’s foreign policy trajectory mirrors his domestic one—transformative at first, but increasingly fraught with risk. His peace deal with Eritrea was a significant achievement, but relations with Eritrea deteriorated after 2022, as Abiy sought access to the Red Sea—a critical economic lifeline for landlocked Ethiopia. His ambition to break the nation’s dependence on Djibouti for trade led him to propose economic incentives for port access, including shares in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Abiy’s rhetoric grew more expansionist. He spoke of merging Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia into a powerful regional bloc. But these aspirations raised concerns among neighboring countries, fueling fears of a revived imperial Ethiopia. As Eritrea mobilized its forces, and tensions mounted, Abiy’s aggressive posture further destabilized an already volatile region. While Abiy’s initial reforms suggested a break with Ethiopia’s authoritarian past, his rule has increasingly been characterized by backsliding. By 2022, media censorship had returned, journalists and activists were detained, and internet shutdowns became common tools of control. Human rights organizations accused Abiy of using state violence to suppress dissent, particularly through Koree Nageenyaa, a secret service in Oromia responsible for alleged unlawful detentions and extrajudicial killings. The 2021 election, which secured Abiy a second term, was marred by opposition boycotts and violence. Western governments, including the United States, decried the election as deeply flawed, citing the detention of opposition leaders like Jawar Mohammed. In recent months, reports have surfaced suggesting that Abiy plans to further consolidate power through a constitutional overhaul, shifting Ethiopia from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, potentially extending his rule until 2037. Seven years after Abiy Ahmed assumed office, Ethiopia finds itself at a crossroads. A nation once filled with hope now grapples with the brutal consequences of war, economic mismanagement, and political repression. Abiy’s legacy is defined by a series of contradictions: Abiy’s greatest challenge now lies in navigating the crises that have come to define his tenure. Will he manage to broker lasting peace in the Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regions? Can he prioritize the immediate humanitarian needs of the Ethiopian people over his grander political and economic ambitions? And, crucially, will he restore the democratic promise that once made him Ethiopia’s beacon of hope? As Ethiopia stands at this crossroads, its future depends on the answers to these questions. For Abiy, history will be the judge—and the judgment, for better or worse, is far from settled.

A Decade Later: Sudan’s True Stance on the Renaissance Dam

By- Asrat Berhanu Today marks exactly 10 years since Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia signed the historic Declaration of Principles (DoP) on the Renaissance Dam. Yet, despite clear, documented support from Sudan, misinformation continues to thrive, primarily from Egyptian sources. Let’s uncover the reality behind Sudan’s stance with clarity, numbers, and history: Back in December 2013, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir openly declared Sudan’s unwavering support for Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam. Fast forward to 2021, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok reaffirmed this support, even announcing Sudan’s plans to undertake new enhancements to the dam at Roseires, leveraging the consistent flow promised by GERD. Why, then, are the Egyptians repeatedly misled into believing Sudan opposes GERD? Because acknowledging Sudan’s support shatters Egypt’s narrative that it’s not alone in opposition. Here are the undisputed facts: Sudan’s Substantial Benefits from GERD: Sudan’s Tangible Contributions to GERD: Under President al-Bashir (1989–2019), Sudan didn’t just verbally support GERD—it backed words with actions. In 2011, Sudan donated over $10 million worth of heavy construction equipment, including bulldozers, excavators, and drilling machinery, directly aiding Ethiopia’s dam-building efforts. Strategic Collaboration: Sudan integrated its energy infrastructure with Ethiopia as early as 2014, benefiting from affordable electricity. Al-Bashir’s government even secured commitments for 200 MW of free power from Ethiopian dams, significantly enhancing Sudan’s energy capacity. Geopolitical Realignment: GERD’s emergence shifted Nile basin alliances. Sudan openly aligned with Ethiopia, distancing itself from Egypt’s traditionally dominant influence. This strategic pivot isolated Egypt, weakening Cairo’s longstanding grip on Nile politics. Clarifying Sudan’s Brief Alignment with Egypt (2021): Although Sudan has consistently supported GERD, transparency demands acknowledging the brief period in 2021 when Sudan’s transitional government, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, temporarily aligned politically with Egypt at the UN Security Council, calling for a legally binding agreement on GERD’s operations. This temporary alignment primarily resulted from internal political pressures, Egypt’s diplomatic maneuvers, and transitional instability after al-Bashir’s removal. Yet, even during this period, Sudan never outright opposed GERD’s construction, instead advocating for binding operational guidelines—something Ethiopia consistently agreed upon through diplomatic dialogue. Debunking the “Collapse Myth”: Despite sensational claims predominantly from Egyptian media, credible international studies and the International Panel of Experts have repeatedly confirmed GERD’s safety and structural integrity. Sudanese experts themselves dismiss collapse fears as unfounded propaganda. The Truth in the Declaration of Principles (2015): The DoP explicitly outlines mutual understanding: A decade later, the evidence is clear: Despite a brief, politically motivated alignment with Egypt in 2021, Sudan’s foundational support for GERD remains robust, well-documented, and indisputable. GERD is not merely Ethiopia’s dam—it’s a regional catalyst benefiting Sudan immensely.

Ethiopia’s Asset Recovery Law: Security Officers Begin Abusing Power Before It’s Even Enforced

The introduction of the Asset Recovery Proclamation in Ethiopia represents a significant step in the country’s anti-corruption strategy. The goal is to recover assets gained through illicit means and deter further corrupt practices within both the public and private sectors. However, the law’s potential for misuse, particularly in terms of targeting political opponents, critics, and ordinary citizens, is a serious concern. This analysis will examine how the Asset Recovery Proclamation could be weaponized for political purposes, using the case of four suspects recently charged with corruption-related offenses as a key example of how state mechanisms, including law enforcement, are already being used to target individuals—even before the law is fully enacted. The case of four suspects charged with threatening investors and accepting money under the pretext of invoking the Asset Recovery Proclamation highlights the danger of abuse in its implementation. The suspects, including police officers, were accused of using the threat of asset confiscation to extort money from individuals, even though the law had not yet been enacted and no formal investigation had begun. The defendants allegedly told an investor that his property was about to be seized under the new proclamation and coerced him into handing over 10,000 birr as a “payment” to prevent such action. This case serves as a stark example of how law enforcement officers may abuse the legal framework—before it is even fully functional—to exert control over individuals and extract money under false pretenses. The fact that police officers were involved in the extortion scheme suggests that state mechanisms designed to enforce the law could, in fact, become part of the problem, actively participating in corruption rather than eradicating it. Moreover, it indicates how quickly and easily the Asset Recovery Proclamation could be manipulated by individuals in positions of power to intimidate and target those without political or legal recourse. The indictment reveals that the suspects went further by claiming to be part of the security forces, which allowed them to extract a one-million birr check from the victim under the false pretense of handling asset confiscation. The fact that these individuals were able to engage in such activity with apparent impunity before the law was even in effect underscores the ease with which such laws can be abused by those with authority. This preemptive targeting of a private citizen illustrates a troubling trend—police officers and others in positions of power might be using the law to intimidate and financially exploit individuals, long before an official investigation or judicial process is even in motion. The Asset Recovery Proclamation is framed as a mechanism to tackle corruption and illicit enrichment, but the case of the suspects underlines how such a law could easily be politicized. The law’s broad and somewhat vague provisions, coupled with a lack of clear guidelines on what constitutes “illicit wealth,” create an opening for political manipulation. Those in power could use the asset recovery process to target individuals based on their political views or affiliations, instead of focusing on actual criminal behavior. In the case of the suspects, the involvement of law enforcement officials who appear to be working with impunity signals a disturbing trend of politicized enforcement. The accused police officers, including an inspector from the Federal Police Commission, clearly used their positions to manipulate the situation for personal gain. This reflects the potential for similar abuses when the law is fully in force: law enforcement officials, government employees, or even political factions could use the proclamation as a political tool to target opposition figures, business rivals, or dissenting voices. Given Ethiopia’s political environment, where political competition can be intense and divisive, the risk of weaponizing the law to eliminate rivals or punish critics becomes a very real concern. The law could easily turn into a tool for silencing opposition or delegitimizing political competitors by accusing them of corrupt activities or illicit wealth accumulation without any credible evidence or investigation. The current case also highlights how the police, long before the law is enacted, have already begun using the perceived power of the Asset Recovery Proclamation to target individuals. The actions of the suspects suggest that the mere threat of asset confiscation under the proclamation is enough to exert control over others, particularly those without the resources to fight back or challenge such claims. This practice of leveraging an as-yet unimplemented law is alarming. If the law can be exploited even before its official enactment, it could be even more dangerous once fully operational. Individuals—especially those critical of the government or those in political opposition—could face unfounded accusations of corruption or illicit wealth accumulation, leading to asset seizures without due process or substantial evidence. A critical issue is that individuals accused under such laws might not have the resources to defend themselves. In a society where political and economic power is often intertwined, a vulnerable individual, or a business leader without political protection, might easily become a target. Their assets could be seized, their reputation tarnished, and their livelihood threatened—all in the name of asset recovery, without a fair trial or even a legitimate investigation. The case of the suspects makes it clear that there needs to be robust safeguards to prevent the abuse of the Asset Recovery Proclamation. Without adequate oversight, this law could become yet another tool for state officials to suppress dissent and consolidate power. To ensure fairness and prevent political targeting, several measures should be put in place: The Asset Recovery Proclamation holds the potential to be a valuable tool in the fight against corruption, but the way it is implemented will determine whether it serves the public good or becomes a vehicle for political repression. The case of the suspects—who have already exploited the legal framework before its official enactment—serves as a cautionary tale of the dangers of unchecked power and the misuse of anti-corruption laws for political ends. To prevent such abuses, the law must be accompanied by strict safeguards, including judicial oversight, independent monitoring, and clear definitions, to ensure it does not become a tool for targeting individuals based on political motivations. Only with these measures in place can the Asset Recovery Proclamation fulfill its original intent—combating corruption—without becoming an instrument of political control.

PM Abiy Arrives in Somalia for Talks on Security, Trade, and Diplomatic Relations

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrived in Mogadishu today, where he was warmly received by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The visit aims to reinforce bilateral ties, with discussions set to focus on security cooperation, economic collaboration, and strengthening diplomatic relations, according to Somalia’s state news agency, SONNA. This marks Abiy’s first visit to Somalia in nearly three years, his last trip being in June 2022 when he attended President Mohamud’s inauguration. His return to Mogadishu comes at a critical time as both nations work to mend their relationship following recent tensions. Relations between Ethiopia and Somalia took a sharp downturn in early 2024 after Addis Ababa signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland in January. The deal granted Ethiopia access to the Red Sea via Somaliland’s Berbera port, with Somaliland claiming that Ethiopia had agreed in principle to recognize its independence. The agreement sparked strong opposition from Somalia, which considers Somaliland an integral part of its territory. Mogadishu denounced the deal as a violation of its sovereignty, leading to a diplomatic rift between the two nations. In response to the escalating tensions, diplomatic efforts—led by regional and international mediators, including Turkey—helped bring the two sides back to the table. A peace agreement brokered by Turkey in December paved the way for reconciliation, and in January 2025, Ethiopia and Somalia officially restored diplomatic ties. PM Abiy’s visit is seen as a significant step in consolidating this renewed partnership. Security cooperation remains a priority for both countries, given the ongoing threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the extremist group that continues to launch attacks in Somalia and across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has historically played a crucial role in supporting Somalia’s counterterrorism efforts, with Ethiopian troops contributing to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Beyond security, trade relations are expected to be a key topic of discussion. Ethiopia, a landlocked nation, has long sought access to regional ports to facilitate its growing economy. While the Somaliland agreement remains a contentious issue, discussions in Mogadishu may explore alternative economic partnerships, including strengthening trade routes through Somalia’s ports. Diplomatic observers view Abiy’s visit as an opportunity to rebuild trust and foster cooperation on mutual interests, balancing Ethiopia’s regional ambitions with Somalia’s territorial integrity. As the leaders engage in high-level talks, the outcome of their discussions could shape the future of Ethiopia-Somalia relations in the years ahead.

Lidetu Ayalew Barred from Boarding Flight to Ethiopia Amid New Travel Restrictions

Ethiopian politician Lidetu Ayalew has alleged that he was unlawfully prevented from boarding a flight to Ethiopia at Atlanta International Airport, despite no official legal charges barring his return. According to Lidetu, airline staff denied him a boarding pass, citing directives from the Ethiopian Embassy in the U.S. He claims his legal team has assured him that aviation law does not permit such restrictions on his movement. “When I arrived at the airport, the airline staff refused to issue me a boarding pass. They told me I needed special permission from the Ethiopian Embassy in the U.S. to travel. However, when I contacted the embassy, my calls went unanswered,” Lidetu stated. While there has been no official statement from the Ethiopian government, MP Desalegn Chane (PhD) has suggested that Lidetu’s travel ban could be linked to recently passed proclamations that grant the government broad powers over immigration and asset control. In a statement, Desalegn Chane warned that the new laws might be used to punish Lidetu and other political opponents living abroad. “I believe there is a broad effort to use recently passed proclamations to punish Ato Lidetu and other government critics abroad. We strongly opposed these laws when they were introduced, but despite our objections, they were passed,” he said. He pointed to two specific proclamations that could explain why Lidetu was prevented from traveling: Under the first law, Lidetu could be legally prohibited from entering Ethiopia. If he has assets in the country, he could also be at risk of asset confiscation under the second proclamation. Desalegn Chane and other opposition leaders have expressed serious concerns that these laws could be used to intimidate and silence government critics. “These proclamations have provisions that could legalize the confiscation of property and even finance terrorism charges to intimidate opponents. Time will tell how far the government will go in using these laws against dissidents like Lidetu,” he added. Critics argue that the Ethiopian government’s ability to control travel and seize assets without due process violates fundamental rights and sets a dangerous precedent for opposition figures living abroad. Despite the ban, Lidetu remains defiant, insisting that he will fight for his right to return home. “No one can stop me from going back to my country. If they want to arrest me upon arrival, they are free to do so. But preventing me from traveling is illegal,” he stated. His legal team is currently exploring legal options to challenge the ban, but the broader implications of these new travel restrictions remain uncertain. As Ethiopia tightens its grip on political opponents, many are now questioning whether these laws will be used selectively to silence dissent—and if Lidetu Ayalew is just the first of many to face such restrictions.

Ethiopian Civil Society Organizations Authority Issues Directive Following USAID Aid Suspension

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – The Civil Society Organizations Authority has issued an urgent statement outlining new directives in response to the recent suspension of aid by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Authority reaffirmed that civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia are permitted to raise funds from any legal source and operate for lawful and ethical purposes, as stipulated under the Civil Society Organizations Proclamation No. 1113/2011. However, it emphasized that organizations must ensure their resources are used in compliance with the law and for the public good. The statement highlighted that the Authority is actively monitoring the implications of USAID’s funding suspension and will provide necessary support and oversight as the situation develops. Furthermore, CSOs currently receiving USAID funding have been strictly prohibited from transferring, disposing of, or selling assets, as well as from transferring funds to third parties for non-project-related purposes without prior authorization from the Authority. The directive underscores the government’s commitment to regulating the sector and ensuring transparency in the use of funds. The Authority warned that any organization found violating this directive will face appropriate legal consequences. This development comes as Ethiopia navigates shifting international aid dynamics, with potential impacts on numerous humanitarian and development projects across the country.

Perennial War in DRC is a Scorn at Africa’s sovereignty

By Mike Omuodo A phone vibration drew my attention to an incoming message – a friend had sent a message with an attachment and a note reading, “This is so sad and needs to stop! The message was followed by some crying emojis. Curious, I opened the attachment. It was a photo of some of the carnage in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – to be precise, the photo of corpses of those killed in the DRC’s never ending war, piled like some wastes from a city garbage truck. My heart bled for the children and women of DRC, the main victims of this horrendous war! The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has killed over 6 million people over decades, stands as a stark reminder of the continent’s internal and external challenges. Despite Africa’s rich history, cultural diversity, and growing potential, the persistent violence in the DRC represents a failure of both African leadership and the international community to address a crisis that undermines the very notion of African unity, independence, and self-determination. The DRC, endowed with an abundance of natural resources—diamonds, gold, copper, coltan—should be one of Africa’s most prosperous countries. Instead, it has become a battlefield where local militias, foreign corporations, and regional powers exploit its riches, leaving its people in poverty and suffering. This is a direct affront to the vision of African sovereignty, which seeks to ensure that African resources benefit Africans and not external actors or corrupt elites. The inability of African nations to decisively intervene and resolve the conflict in the DRC highlights a painful reality: while African leaders have championed unity and cooperation through platforms like the African Union (AU), they have largely failed to protect one of their own from decades of exploitation and war. The silence and inaction of many African governments on the DRC crisis is a scorn to the idea of Pan-Africanism, which promises solidarity and collective action in the face of injustice. The war in the DRC is also a reflection of how foreign interests continue to meddle in African affairs, undermining Africa’s sovereignty. Since colonial times, external powers have exploited the DRC for its natural resources, leaving the country in a state of perpetual conflict. Today, multinational corporations and foreign governments continue to benefit from the illegal extraction of the DRC’s minerals, funding armed groups and prolonging instability. African leaders have a moral and political obligation to assert Africa’s control over its own resources and territory. Allowing foreign actors to dictate the fate of one of the continent’s richest nations not only diminishes the sovereignty of the DRC but also weakens the entire continent’s ability to defend its economic and political interests. Failed Governance At the heart of the DRC crisis is the failure of governance. While external actors have played a significant role in the conflict, internal divisions, corruption, and weak leadership within the DRC have exacerbated the situation. Successive governments have struggled to maintain control over vast portions of the country, allowing warlords and militias to fill the power vacuum. However, the broader failure lies in the inability of African leaders to come together and address these internal issues through diplomatic pressure, peace-building, and robust intervention. Instead, some regional powers have been accused of further destabilizing the country by supporting rebel groups and exploiting the chaos for their own gains. This lack of leadership not only prolongs the suffering of millions of Congolese but also erodes trust in Africa’s ability to solve its own problems. Strategic Imperative This war shouldn’t be seen merely as Congo’s problem but as a moral and strategic imperative for the entire African continent. The ongoing conflict undermines Africa’s collective goals of peace, security, and economic development. It destabilizes a region that is critical to the future of Africa, limits economic growth, and diverts attention from pressing continental issues such as poverty alleviation, infrastructure development, and healthcare. Allowing the DRC to remain in a state of war or even degenerate further into the abyss reflects poorly on the African Union and regional organizations like the East African Community and Southern African Development Community (SADC), which have the capacity to mediate and intervene. If African leaders do not act now to stop the violence and build sustainable peace, it will signal a failure to live up to the founding principles of these organizations and African independence itself. Reclaiming sovereignty This war is not just a humanitarian catastrophe; it is a direct challenge to Africa’s ability to assert control over its own destiny. The conflict has exposed the fragility of African sovereignty and the vulnerability of the continent’s vast resources to external exploitation. To truly live up to the promise of a united, independent, and prosperous Africa, African leaders must rise to the occasion, reclaim the DRC’s sovereignty, and bring an end to this senseless war. Inaction or passive diplomacy will only deepen the wounds and prolong the suffering. It’s time for Africa to lead by example, assert its political will, and save the DRC from becoming a permanent scar on the continent’s legacy. The war in the DRC cannot be allowed to continue as a scorn upon Africa’s sovereignty. The writer is a pan-African Public Relations and Communications expert based in Nairobi, Kenya.

The House of Peoples’ Representatives Holds Special Session to Address Land Lease, Education, and Agricultural Issues

The 6th House of Peoples’ Representatives convened its 1st special session for the 4th year of its operational term. The session focuses on critical legislative matters, including reviewing reports, approving draft proclamations, and endorsing loan agreements. One of the key agenda items is the Ministry of Agriculture’s six-month implementation report for the 2025 fiscal year. The report is expected to outline progress, challenges, and future plans in achieving the ministry’s objectives. The session will also consider the approval of two significant loan agreements aimed at supporting the country’s development priorities. The details of these agreements and their intended impacts will be deliberated during the session. Furthermore, the House will deliberate on the draft proclamation concerning urban land tenure, land-related property registration, and urban land leasing, based on the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Urban Infrastructure and Transport Affairs. If approved, the proclamation is expected to modernize land administration systems, improve urban development, and enhance transparency in land leasing processes. Another major focus will be the review of the draft proclamation on general education. The Standing Committee on Human Resources Development, Employment, and Technology Affairs is set to present its report and recommendations, with the House expected to approve the proclamation. This legislative move aims to reform and strengthen the general education system to address existing gaps and ensure equitable access. The outcomes of this special session are anticipated to have a significant impact on Ethiopia’s legislative and development framework, particularly in the areas of urban land lease management, education reform, and agricultural progress.

Somalia’s President Visits Egypt After Ethiopia: Balancing Regional Tensions

Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Cairo on Thursday for an official visit to meet with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The visit, made at the invitation of President al-Sisi, highlights the deepening ties between Somalia and Egypt while drawing regional attention due to recent geopolitical developments. The Somali national news agency SONNA reported that discussions during the visit will focus on bolstering “joint efforts to combat terrorism and accelerating cooperation in the fields of security and peace in the region.” Additionally, the leaders are expected to explore “enhancing opportunities for economic and developmental cooperation,” signaling a growing partnership between the two nations. This visit comes on the heels of President Mohamud’s recent trip to Ethiopia, which followed the Ankara Deal—an agreement aimed at improving Ethiopia-Somalia relations. The timing of Mohamud’s visit to Egypt has raised eyebrows, given the heightened tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia over Egypt’s reported security presence in Somalia. Reports of Egyptian involvement in the region have strained Ethiopia-Somalia relations, with Ethiopia viewing Egypt’s expanding footprint as a potential threat to its influence, especially in the Horn of Africa. Adding to the complexity, Mohamud’s choice to visit Cairo so soon after his trip to Addis Ababa has surprised regional observers. It underscores Somalia’s delicate balancing act in navigating relationships with neighboring Ethiopia and Egypt—two nations with competing interests, particularly regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute and broader regional security dynamics. This visit also builds on the momentum of Mohamud’s August 2024 trip to Cairo, during which Somalia and Egypt signed a defense pact to strengthen bilateral security cooperation. That agreement, coupled with the growing trade between the two nations—reaching $59 million in the first half of 2024, an 88% increase compared to the same period in 2023—solidifies Egypt’s role as a key ally for Somalia. However, it has fueled concerns in Ethiopia about Egypt’s potential influence in the Horn of Africa. President Mohamud’s Cairo trip signals Somalia’s strategic engagement with regional powers while navigating complex geopolitical tensions. As Mohamud and al-Sisi meet, the outcomes of their discussions will be closely watched, with implications not just for bilateral relations but also for the broader Horn of Africa region. This visit highlights Somalia’s ambition to strengthen ties with Egypt while maintaining a delicate balance in its relations with Ethiopia.